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DUAL REGULATION OF INSURANCE
CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH*
ABSTRACT
Since this country was created, the insurance industry has been princi-
pally regulated by the states with infrequent Congressional interventions.
As the insurance industry has evolved in recent decades, however, individ-
ual states have become unable to adequately regulate some insurers, such
as multinational insurers and foreign insurers, because they lack jurisdic-
tion over such entities. Simply having the federal government assume re-
sponsibility for regulating insurers will not solve the current regulatory
problems, however, because Congress’ past forays into regulating certain
areas of insurance generally have yielded poor results. Consequently, this
Article makes the novel proposal and argument that, with the creation of
the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) in 2010, the time is ripe for dual state
and federal regulation of insurance. The FIO could regulate the areas of
insurance where states are unable to do so or have done so inadequately
while the states could continue to regulate areas where they have demon-
strated competence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE basic legal approach to regulating insurance has been the same inthis country since 1782 when insurance companies first formed in the
United States.  It is time for a change, and this Article proposes a novel
approach to regulating insurance in the twenty-first century.
Most of the scholarship regarding insurance regulation involves the
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945,1 which is the statute that reserved the
regulation of the business of insurance to the states, and it has focused on
whether the insurance industry should be exempt from federal antitrust
laws and be permitted to collude regarding premium prices and the shar-
ing of claims data.2  This Article does not address that issue because the
insurance industry generally is competitive today regarding pricing and
extensive information regarding prospective policyholders and claims data
is readily available in this age of “Big Data.”3  Consequently, the question
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2018).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act
of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role of Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 13
(1993); Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson Act
Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
397 (1988); Earl W. Kintner, Joseph P. Bauer & Michael J. Allen, Application of the
Antitrust Laws to the Activities of Insurance Companies: Heavier Risks, Expanded Coverage,
and Greater Liability, 63 N.C. L. REV. 431 (1985); Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and
Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81
(1983); Larry D. Carlson, The Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 1127 (1979); Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State
Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56
MICH. L. REV. 545 (1958).
3. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 85 (“The insurance industry is
ideally suited to rate setting by competitive forces.”); J. David Cummins, Property-
Liability Insurance Price Deregulation: The Last Bastion?, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-
LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY
1, 7 (J. David Cummins ed., 2004) (“Advances in computing and databases allow
2
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of whether the antitrust exemption provided under the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act should be repealed is not as important today as it may have been
in the past.  Instead, this Article asks and answers the question of whether
the current regulatory regime, in which states are the primary regulators
of insurance, is still the best regulatory approach in the twenty-first cen-
tury.  The answer is “no.”
The insurance industry has evolved and grown so much since this
country was created in the 1700s, and since the McCarran-Ferguson Act
was passed in 1945, that states are no longer able to adequately regulate
many important aspects of insurance.  Today, the insurance industry is
dominated by large multinational and foreign insurers that are beyond the
regulatory jurisdictions of individual states.4  Indeed, under the current
regulatory regime, no regulatory entity in the United States is actually reg-
ulating foreign insurers or multinational insurers in a comprehensive way.
A prime example of how this lack of comprehensive regulation has
become a problem was the financial collapse of American International
Group, Inc. (AIG) in 2008 and the federal government’s subsequent
$182.5 billion bailout of AIG.5  AIG is a multinational insurer that does
business throughout the United States and the world as a conglomeration
of affiliated and subsidiary insurance companies.6  Each state, however,
all but the smallest insurers to analyze data and conduct actuarial calculations with
a speed and sophistication unheard of in the past, reducing the need to rely upon
rating bureaus with their potential for stifling competition.”); Max N. Helveston,
Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 859, 862 (2016) (“In-
surers, always interested in refining their predictive capabilities, have been aggres-
sively integrating Big Data methodologies into their business operations.”); Rick
Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339, 340
(2015) (“Big data is at the insurance industry’s door.”).
4. See, e.g., Benjamin Elisha Sawe, Largest Insurance Companies in the World by
Revenue, WORLD ATLAS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/larg
est-insurance-companies-in-the-world-by-revenue.html [https://perma.cc/RY3F-N2
AZ] (listing the ten largest insurance companies in the world and noting the prev-
alence of multinational companies at the top of the list); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) (“A basic principle of federalism is
that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is per-
mitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine what
measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its juris-
diction.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 33.
5. See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 943 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 945 (“AIG is ‘a holding company which,
through its subsidiaries, is engaged in a broad range of insurance and insurance-
related activities in the United States and abroad.’”); Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical
Take on Group Regulation of Insurers in the United States, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 537,
543–44 (2015) (“Historically, many large insurance holding companies adapted to
the mismatch between state-based insurance regulation and the national and inter-
national scope of their operations by incorporating individual insurance entities
within multiple different states.”); Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulat-
ing Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1633 (2014) (“[I]nsurance
holding companies operate in numerous jurisdictions through many different sub-
sidiaries . . . .”).
3
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can only regulate the AIG entities that are doing business in its state.7
Consequently, although the states collectively were regulating the various
pieces of AIG that did business in their states in 2008, AIG arguably col-
lapsed because no single state or the federal government was actually regu-
lating AIG as a whole.  The states were looking at the various trees of AIG,
but no one was looking at AIG the forest.
In addition to the lack of regulation of multinational and foreign in-
surers, the current regulatory regime is a patchwork quilt of inconsistent
state laws.8  In practice, this means the outcomes of many insurance dis-
putes are dictated by which party wins the race to the courthouse to secure
the more favorable state law.9  This makes the resolution of insurance dis-
putes appear to be ad hoc and arbitrary, which generally undermines the
public’s confidence in the fairness of the legal system.
Having fifty state insurance commissioners review and approve the
dozens of policy forms that are used by insurers is also ineffective.  Insur-
ance policies are contracts of adhesion drafted solely by insurers and then
sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the public, which is required to buy
insurance to ensure that victims of auto accidents, for example, have a
source of compensation.10  Yet, state insurance commissioners’ approval
7. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422; Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 33.
8. See PETER J. KALIS ET AL., POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE § 26.03[B] (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2018) (“Insurance contracts are inter-
preted according to state law.  Not surprisingly, the manner in which the courts of
the various states address similar interpretive issues can vary widely from one state
to the next.  The different interpretations given the same standardized language
from one state to the next can mean the difference between a covered and a non-
covered claim.”); Charles R. McGuire, Regulation of the Insurance Industry after Hart-
ford Fire Insurance v. California; The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Policies, 25
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 303, 352 (1994) (“It is extremely difficult for the federal govern-
ment to regulate the international aspects of the insurance industry under the
antitrust laws.  It is virtually impossible for the states to do so.”).
9. See, e.g., 2 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 24:1 (December
2017 Update) (“In theory, the laws of two states cannot control the interpretation
of a contract of insurance, and the choice of which jurisdiction’s law will govern
can have serious consequences for an insurance dispute.”).  The courts’ inconsis-
tent interpretation of the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion is a prime
example of courts in various states interpreting identical policy language to mean
different things. Compare Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092
(Colo. 1991) (“Although ‘sudden’ can reasonably be defined to mean abrupt or
immediate, it can also reasonably be defined to mean unexpected and unin-
tended.  Since the term ‘sudden’ is susceptible to more than one reasonable defi-
nition, the term is ambiguous, and we therefore construe the phrase ‘sudden and
accidental’ against the insurer to mean unexpected and unintended.”), with Am.
Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Grp., Inc., 659 A.2d 1295, 1308 (Md. 1995) (“[T]he
language of such an exclusion provides coverage only for pollution which is both
sudden and accidental.  It does not apply to gradual pollution carried out on an
ongoing basis during the course of business.”).
10. See, e.g., 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTESEN, ON INSURANCE COVER-
AGE § 4.06[B], 4–65 (4th ed. 2018) (“The typical insurance policy sale is marked by
formality and routinization. Consequently, insurance policies almost always are
both standardized contracts and contracts of adhesion . . . .”); Michelle Boardman,
4
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of policy forms is essentially a rubber stamp without a substantive review of
the terms and coverage provided in the policies, and no one involved in
the process is representing the interests of consumers.11  Indeed, the re-
view and approval of policy forms is a classic example of regulatory cap-
ture wherein the regulators are oftentimes advancing only the interests of
the regulated parties—the insurers.12
States also cannot police insurer misconduct that occurs on a nation-
wide basis.13  The United States Supreme Court highlighted this problem
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,14 when the Court
set aside a punitive damage award intended to punish an insurer for the
insurer’s nationwide policy and practice of preying upon powerless con-
Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091
(2010) (discussing the “hyperstandardization” of policies); James M. Fischer, Why
Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“[T]here is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the
standardized language of the insurance contract that determines the scope of cov-
erage.”); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125
(2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical
coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis . . . . Forty-seven states and the District
of Columbia require automobile liability insurance covering bodily injury and
property damage in specified amounts.”); MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE: CONSUMER DEMAND, MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 (2003)
(“[H]omeowners insurance . . . is essentially mandatory . . . .”); EMMETT J.
VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 539–41
(8th ed. 1999) (conducting a fifty-state survey of the compulsory automobile liabil-
ity insurance laws).
11. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 131, 143, 146 (6th ed. 2015); Kenneth S. Abra-
ham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 663 (2013); Eugene R.
Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively
Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 336, 402–05
(1998).
12. See, e.g., Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory
Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 625, 639, 676–78 (1999) (the insurance industry is a classic example of regula-
tory capture); Anderson & Fournier, supra note 11, at 336 (“Insurance industry
control over state insurance regulators is notorious.”); Richard B. Stewart, The Ref-
ormation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1713 (1975) (“It has
become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic crit-
ics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency members, that the comparative
overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency deci-
sion results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.  Such overrepre-
sentation stems from both the structure of agency decisionmaking and from the
difficulties inherent in organizing often diffuse classes of persons with opposing
interests.”).  George J. Stigler is generally recognized as the person who popular-
ized the concept of regulatory capture through his article, George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–21 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (“Laws have no
force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, and
can have extraterritorial effect only by the comity of other states.”).
14. 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003) (disallowing punitive damages award that was
based upon nationwide insurer misconduct).
5
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sumers.  Without the power to police insurers on a nationwide basis, insur-
ers can and do misbehave with limited consequences.15
States also cannot mandate specific coverages under insurance poli-
cies on a nationwide basis.16  For example, some of the most common and
devastating catastrophic perils are floods and landslides.  Floods have
caused more than $240 billion in damage in the United States over the
past thirty years, for an annual average of approximately $8 billion, and
landslides cause approximately $3.5 billion in property damage per year.17
Insurers, however, currently refuse to cover these natural catastrophes
under homeowners policies even though these are the very types of cata-
strophic risks for which people most need insurance.18  Developed coun-
tries throughout the world have recognized the need for individuals to
have insurance for natural catastrophes and they either provide such cov-
erage under government insurance programs or require private insurers
to include such coverage in the policies they sell.19  Due to political pres-
sures, however, it is unlikely that each of the fifty states in America will
mandate that insurers cover these types of catastrophic risks without fed-
eral intervention, particularly in light of the fact the states have not done
so thus far.
15. See generally JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010).
16. See e.g., Huntington, 146 U.S. at 669.
17. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.’S NAT’L  WEATHER SERV., HY-
DROLOGIC INFORMATION CENTER—FLOOD LOSS DATA (2013), http://www.nws.noaa
.gov/hic/ [https://perma.cc/US99-MS5V]; U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, LANDSLIDE
TYPES AND PROCESSES (2004); Rob Risley, Comment, Landslide Peril and Homeowners’
Insurance in California, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1145, 1146–47 (1993); Landslides in the
United States Since 2007, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 23, 2014), https://news.national
geographic.com/news/2014/04/140422-surveying-american-landslides-interac
tive/ [https://perma.cc/CS4R-UB7J].
18. See Warren Kriesel & Craig Landry, Participation in the National Flood Insur-
ance Program: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties, 71 J. RISK & INS. 405, 405
(2004) (discussing the exclusion of coverage for flooding); Sample Homeowners
Policy, Section I—Exclusions, §§ A.2 and 3, reprinted in CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH &
ROBERT H. JERRY, II, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 608–09 (2018) (reproducing
the landslide and flood exclusions in ISO’s 2010 standard form homeowners pol-
icy); Brian Mattis, Earth Movement Claims Under All Risk Insurance: The Rules Have
Changed in California, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 29, 36 (1990) (citing State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co.’s Homeowners Policy Special Form 3, p. 7, Form FP-7103); Ins. Servs.
Office, Inc., Causes of Loss—Special Form, Commercial Property Form CP 10 30 10 12
§ B.1.b.2. and g., at 1, reprinted in BRUCE J. HILLMAN, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY 411
(4th ed. 2009) (reproducing the landslide and flood exclusions contained in ISO’s
2007 standard form commercial property policy).
19. See Christopher C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and Devastat-
ing Natural Catastrophes in America, 60 VILL. L. REV. 53, 77–78 (2015) [hereinafter
Insuring Floods] (discussing coverage for flooding in United Kingdom, France, and
Belgium); Christopher C. French, Insuring Landslides: America’s Uninsured Natural
Catastrophes, 17 NEV. L.J. 63, 89–94 (2016) [hereinafter Insuring Landslides] (dis-
cussing coverage for landslides in New Zealand, France, Belgium, Norway,
Romania, Switzerland, Iceland, and Australia).
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss1/2
2019] DUAL REGULATION 31
One obvious solution to these problems would be to give Congress
exclusive power to regulate the insurance industry because the federal
government does not suffer from the jurisdictional problem that states do.
Despite the superficial appeal of such a solution, it would be a mistake
because exclusive federal regulation of the insurance industry becomes
problematic when one considers Congress’ record in the area of insurance
regulation.
Congress’ past efforts to regulate some areas of insurance, such as the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)20 and the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),21 reveals that consumers receive
less protection under federal law in these areas of insurance than they
would receive under state law in many respects.  For example, state law
remedies allow for an award of compensatory or punitive damages for bad
faith denials of coverage, but such remedies are preempted and elimi-
nated under ERISA.22  Thus, an insured that is wrongfully denied cover-
age generally is awarded only the amount of the claim that was wrongfully
denied under ERISA so there is no downside financial risk for employers
to wrongfully deny insurance benefits to their employees.23
20. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1003).
21. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131 (2018)).
22. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004) (affirming the
dismissal of state law claims regarding the allegedly improper denial of health in-
surance benefits); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1987) (af-
firming the dismissal of state law claims for punitive damages for allegedly denying
disability insurance benefits in bad faith).  Many legal scholars have been critical of
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA in this regard. See, e.g., Daniel Fis-
chel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit
Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1988) (“[T]he mess in ERISA fiduciary law
cannot be ameliorated until courts . . . recognize the multiplicity of interests that
inhere in the modern pension and employee benefit trust.”); Russell Korobkin,
The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Pre-
emption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 460 (2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court, in interpreting
ERISA, rather than Congress in drafting it, . . . is most responsible for the current
confused and illogical state of managed care law.”); John H. Langbein, What ERISA
Means By “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and
Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1365 (2003) (“The Supreme Court needs to
confess its error in ERISA remedy law, much as it has recently confronted its mis-
handling of ERISA preemption, and to realign ERISA remedy law with the trust
remedial tradition that Congress intended . . . .”); David L. Shapiro, Justice Gins-
burg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her Contributions in the Fields of Procedure and
Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 23 (2004) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg’s dis-
sent in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) was cor-
rect in stating that Congress did not intend to limit plan beneficiary’s remedies
under ERISA as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court’s majority).
23. ERISA does give courts discretion to award prejudgment interest and at-
torneys’ fees so an aggrieved insured at least has a chance of obtaining a financially
neutral result due to an improper denial of coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
7
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Similarly, under the NFIP, the private insurers who sell NFIP policies
and adjust flood claims are immune to liability for bad faith conduct.24
And, under the federal government’s guidance and control, the NFIP pro-
gram has been insolvent for many years with a current debt of approxi-
mately $23 billion and even deeper losses on the horizon due to
Hurricane Florence.25  Thus, neither ERISA nor the NFIP, as examples of
federal regulation of insurance, inspire confidence that exclusive federal
regulation of insurance would be preferable to state regulation.
Consequently, instead of either state or federal regulation of insur-
ance, this Article proposes a new approach—dual regulation of the insur-
ance industry.  States would still control those aspects of insurance they
currently regulate for which they have demonstrated competence and
have jurisdictional authority, such as ensuring that premium rates in their
states are not excessive.  The Federal Insurance Office (FIO), an entity
created in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),26 would be given authority to regulate
other areas of insurance on a national basis.  The FIO could draft insur-
ance policy forms to be used nationally.  The FIO also could adopt the
best existing state consumer protection insurance laws at the federal level
as regulations and create new rules to govern foreign and multinational
insurers.
In explaining why a dual regulatory approach is warranted at this
time, this Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I sets forth the history of
insurance regulation in the United States, including the reasons why insur-
ance is regulated, the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and the fed-
eral government’s current involvement in some areas of insurance such as
ERISA, the NFIP, and the Affordable Care Act.  Part II discusses the emer-
gence and dominance of multinational, global insurers since the 1990s.
Part II also discusses new alternative risk transfer mechanisms that have
become prevalent, such as catastrophe bonds and reinsurance, which have
changed the way insurers do business.  Part III expounds upon some of
the existing problems with states serving as the primary regulators of insur-
ance, such as the inconsistent state laws, the inability to meaningfully regu-
late multinational and foreign insurers, and the inability to regulate
insurers on a nationwide basis.  Part IV sets forth the novel proposal of a
24. See, e.g., Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 2007) (no
recovery of extra-contractual damages under NFIP); Gallup v. Omaha Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 341, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2005) (extra-contractual state-law claims
are preempted by federal law under NFIP); Ernest B. Abbott, Floods, Flood Insur-
ance, Litigation, Politics—and Catastrophe: The National Flood Insurance Program, 1 SEA
GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 129, 144–45, 147–50 (2008); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policy-
holders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C.L. REV. 3,
33–34, 38 (2006).
25. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-317, HIGH-RISK SERIES:
PROGRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON
OTHERS 619 (2017).
26. 31 U.S.C. § 313 (2018).
8
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dual regulatory regime in which the FIO would become the lead federal
regulatory agency responsible for some areas of insurance while states
would continue to regulate other areas.
II. THE HISTORY OF INSURANCE REGULATION
A. The Reasons Why the Insurance Industry Is Regulated
Broadly defined, insurance is the transfer of risk from one party to
another party in exchange for a monetary payment.27  Most entities
purchase insurance in order to avoid uncertain, but possible, losses in the
future.28  In essence, someone who purchases insurance incurs a relatively
small certain loss through the payment of a premium in exchange for the
promise by the other party that it will bear the risk of larger, uncertain
future losses.29
How to characterize insurance (e.g., as a contract, a product, etc.),
and the principal purpose of insurance, has been the subject of some de-
bate among scholars.30  In one conception, insurance fulfills a public
function as a social safety net by which risks are distributed from individu-
als to a larger group or community, often using private entities as in-
termediaries.31  Its role as a quasi-public utility is one of many reasons why
the insurance industry is regulated.32
A second reason the insurance industry is regulated is that, in today’s
world, people and businesses cannot effectively function without insur-
ance.  Indeed, several lines of insurance are mandatory.  For example, in
27. See, e.g., J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide Insurance for Ca-
tastrophes?, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 337, 342 (2006).
28. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 10 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that people become more risk averse as
the potential magnitude of loss increases).
29. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 28, at 11 (describing how risk
averse people prefer to lose one dollar with certainty rather than take a one in ten
thousand chance of losing ten thousand dollars); FEINMAN, supra note 15, at 14 (an
entity that purchases insurance prefers to “exchange a small, certain loss to avoid”
a larger, uncertain loss).
30. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 11, at 657 (describing four different concep-
tions of insurance: (1) as a contract, (2) as a public utility/industry, (3) as a prod-
uct, and (4) as a surrogate government for regulating policyholder behavior);
Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance
Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1397–1400 (2007) (treating insurance poli-
cies as products); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and
Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495–1513 (2010) [hereinafter The
Insurance Policy as Social Instrument] (emphasizing the socially significant role insur-
ance plays in modern society); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813, 835 (2009) (analyzing insurance policies as
“things”).
31. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 11, at 668; Christopher C. French, The Role of
the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1092–93 (2015);
Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 30, at 1497.
32. See Abraham, supra note 11, at 668–70 (describing insurance’s similarity to
utilities prompting further regulation).
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order to purchase a house with a mortgage, the buyer must have home-
owners insurance adequate to cover the mortgage amount.33  Auto insur-
ance is also mandatory.34  Workers’ compensation insurance is required in
every state except Texas.35  In many business transactions, such as con-
struction contracts, one party is required to maintain insurance to cover
the project.36  Besides the mandatory lines of insurance, natural disasters
such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods impact millions of people and
businesses in every state.  Without insurance, each passing storm would
present the risk of financial ruin and bankruptcy.
A third reason is because there is a delay between when policyholders
purchase policies and when insurers’ obligations to pay claims arise.  Con-
sequently, there is a need to ensure that insurers are still solvent when the
time to pay claims arises.  Indeed, ensuring the solvency of insurers is one
of the principal focuses of insurance regulation.37
A fourth reason is because insurance advances the public policy of
ensuring that injured parties will be compensated.38  Many injuries would
go uncompensated in the absence of insurance because most people are
judgment proof—i.e., they do not have the money or assets needed to pay
for their liabilities.39  Thus, in the absence of insurance, many injured
33. See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 30, at 1497;
French, supra note 31, at 1094.
34. See supra note 10.
35. See, e.g., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2015) (“Except for pub-
lic employers and as otherwise provided by law, an employer may elect to obtain
workers’ compensation insurance coverage.”); ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note
11, at 421 (“[W]orkers compensation is a no-fault substitute for employers’ tort
liability and is mandated in every state except Texas, where employers may opt-out,
and about one-third of employers do so.”); GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 556 (9th ed. 2005) (“All states today have workers
compensation laws.”).
36. See, e.g., Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 30, at
1498–99.
37. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 2, at 1138–39 (“[T]he primary [reason for
insurer regulation] seems to be the need to preserve the solvency and stability of
insurers.”); Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2, at 547–48 (noting that the number of
insurance companies in the 1800s went from 4000 to 1000 due to insurer insolven-
cies following catastrophic fire events); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 28, at 61
(“Insureds commonly invest substantial sums of money in insurance policies that
promise . . . payments . . . for loss of property and harm to other interests. Conse-
quently, the bankruptcy of an insurer can cause substantial hardship and suffering
for insureds . . . .”).
38. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 28, at 924–25 (stating the purpose
of mandatory auto insurance coverage is to ensure that victims of automobile acci-
dents have access to funds to cover their losses).
39. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 603, 606 (2006) (explaining why judgments generally are uncollectible); Kyle
D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1375–76 (1994)
(analyzing insurance as a potential solution to the judgment-proof problem); S.
Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 47–52 (1986) (dis-
cussing the problems created by judgment-proof individuals).
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people would not be able to pay their medical bills and they could not
recoup their lost income.
A fifth reason the insurance industry is regulated is because it is one
of the largest industries in the world.  The insurance premiums paid in the
United States alone total approximately $1.9 trillion.40  The insurance in-
dustry now accounts for approximately 2.5% of the United States’ gross
domestic product and employs 2.5 million people.41  Yet, despite its im-
portance, insurance is the only major industry that is not regulated on a
plenary basis by the federal government.42
A sixth reason the insurance industry is regulated is that consumers
need protection from insurer overreach because of how insurance policies
are created and sold.43  The creation and sale of insurance policies is a
reflection of a bygone era.  Insurance policies typically are long, complex,
standard form contracts of adhesion drafted by insurers using antiquated
jargon and then sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.44
There are, however, some advantages to using standardized policy
forms.  For example, they allow for the mass sales of policies without nego-
tiations for each policy.45  This reduces transaction costs and eliminates
the need to negotiate regarding the policy language.46  In addition, the
actuarial data that is used to price premiums would be unreliable if stan-
dardized language were not used because the claims data would not be
based upon the same coverages sold.47  Having insurers use the same pol-
40. See RAYMOND A. GUENTER & ELISABETH DITOMASSI, FUNDAMENTALS OF IN-
SURANCE REGULATION: THE RULES AND RATIONALE 1 (2017).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 14; Anthony J. Alt, Congress’ Self-
Inflicted Sisyphean Task: The Insurance Industry’s Federal Antitrust Exemption and the
Insurance Industry Competition Acts of 2007 and 2009, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 399, 426
(2010).
43. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as Non-Con-
tracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial Instru-
ments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 551 (2017).
44. See supra note 10.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981); Sajida A. Mahdi, Gateway to Arbitration: Issues of Contract Formation Under the
U.C.C. and the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Included in Standard Form Contracts
Shipped with Goods, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 403, 403 (2001).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a and cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 1981); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Con-
tracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 437–39 (2002); Mark A. Lemley,
Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 465 (2006).
47. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boiler-
plate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2006) (“[T]he cost of each clause becomes
increasingly clear as actuarial data is collected and pooled.”); Macey & Miller, supra
note 2, at 53 (“In the absence of form standardization, it would be difficult to
compile an adequate statistical data base on which to base risk assessments.”).
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icy forms also allows consumers to compare insurers based upon the price
of the policy being sold.48
Currently, either individual insurers or the Insurance Services Office,
Inc. (ISO), a private company, drafts almost all of the standardized policy
forms used in the United States.49  Insurers pay fees for ISO membership,
and, as members of ISO, insurers are entitled to use ISO’s policy forms.50
In addition, “[f]or each of its standard policy forms, ISO also supplies ac-
tuarial and rating information: it collects, aggregates, interprets, and dis-
tributes data on the premiums charged, claims filed and paid, and defense
costs expended with respect to each form . . . .”51
The advantages of using standardized policy forms evaporate, how-
ever, if the policy forms created and used do not provide good insurance
coverage for the purchasers of the policies.  Consequently, one would ex-
pect that consumers would have a significant role in the drafting of the
language and coverages set forth in insurance policies to ensure that the
policies are good, but they actually do not have any role in the drafting or
approval process.52  Indeed, the purchasers of insurance typically do not
even get an opportunity to review the policy they are purchasing before
payment is due.  Instead, the purchaser gets a copy of the policy long after
it has paid at least the initial premium for it.53  To some extent, the timing
of when the policy is provided to the purchaser is not that important, how-
ever, because policyholders rarely read the policies they do receive and
they generally cannot understand the policies anyway due to policies’
length and complexity.54
As a result of these dynamics—incomprehensible policies created by a
massive industry that are sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the public who
is legally required to buy the policies to ensure that injured parties are
compensated—there is little debate that the insurance industry needs to
48. See Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 18 (“[A]ccurate information cannot
be developed—and consumers cannot easily comparison shop on the basis of
price—unless firms in the industry have access to standardized forms.”).
49. ISO’s membership is comprised of approximately 1,400 property and cas-
ualty insurers and “is the almost exclusive source of support services in this country
for CGL [commercial general liability] insurance.”  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cali-
fornia, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993).  In fact, “most CGL insurance written in the
United States is written on [ISO] forms.” Id.
50. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 11, at 36–37.
51. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 772 (internal citations omitted).
52. See, e.g., French, supra note 43, at 548.
53. See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 47, at 1120; Randall, supra note 10, at 107;
Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Con-
tracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 174 (1995).
54. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 11, at 660; Boardman, supra note 47, at
1120; Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970); Randall, supra note 10, at 107, 125; Rappaport,
supra note 53, at 174.
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be regulated.55  The question then becomes, “Who should regulate the
insurance industry?”
B. State Regulation of Insurance between 1752 and 1944
Like many aspects of American history, insurance in the United States
can trace its roots to England.  Lloyd’s of London was the first insurer of
vessels and cargo in the late seventeenth century and, after the Great Fire
of London in 1666, London insurers also began selling insurance that cov-
ered non-marine properties for fire losses.56  The first U.S. insurance com-
pany was the “Philadelphia Contributorship for Insuring Houses from
Loss by Fire,” which was established in Philadelphia in 1752 with Ben
Franklin as one of its first directors.57  Since its initial creation in the
United States, the insurance industry has been principally regulated by the
states, not the federal government.58
Ironically, insurers have changed their position over the years regard-
ing whether they prefer that the states or the federal government regulate
their industry.  State regulation of insurers initially was somewhat haphaz-
ard, with each state creating its own rules.59  By the 1860s, insurers had
grown weary of the patchwork regulation of insurance by the various states
and they were urging Congress to create national standards for the insur-
ance industry that were analogous to the ones created for financial
institutions.60
In an effort to remove states as the primary regulators of the insur-
ance industry, several New York insurance companies created a test case
designed to bring an end to state regulation.  Paul, a Virginia resident, was
appointed by the New York insurance companies to act as their agent.61
Paul applied for a Virginia insurance license, but he refused to comply
with a Virginia law that required him to deposit bonds with the state trea-
surer.62  Paul was denied a license, but he nonetheless sold insurance to a
Virginia resident.63  As a result, he was charged and convicted of violating
55. Carlson, supra note 2, at 1138–39 (“Scholars have advanced several rea-
sons why insurance should be regulated, but the primary one seems to be the need
to preserve the solvency and stability of insurers.”); Alt, supra note 42, at 427 (“It is
generally agreed that the purpose of antitrust laws is to promote the welfare and
best interests of consumers.  It is also widely held that entirely unregulated compe-
tition in the insurance industry is not an alternative.”); Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra
note 6, at 1580 (“The central goal of state insurance regulation is to protect con-
sumers from various risks involved with purchasing insurance coverage.”).
56. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 28, at 16–18.
57. FEINMAN, supra note 15, at 21.
58. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 28, at 64–69.
59. Id. at 65.
60. Id.
61. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868), overruled in part by United States v. S.-
E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
62. Id. at 169.
63. Id.
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Virginia’s licensing statute.64  The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Paul’s
conviction.65  Paul appealed his conviction to the United States Supreme
Court, arguing that Virginia’s stricter requirements for foreign insurers
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution and
that the federal commerce power bestowed exclusive power on the federal
government to regulate insurers.66
In 1869, the Supreme Court rejected Paul’s arguments, which effec-
tively terminated insurers’ efforts to shift insurance regulation from states
to the federal government.67  In reaching its decision, the Court held that
insurance was not interstate commerce subject to federal regulation under
the Commerce Clause:
Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.
The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss by
fire, entered into between the corporations and the assured, for a
consideration paid by the latter.  These contracts are not articles
of commerce in any proper meaning of the word.  They are not
subjects of trade and barter offered in the market as something
having an existence and value independent of the parties to
them.  They are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded
from one State to another, and then put up for sale.  They are
like other personal contracts between parties which are com-
pleted by their signature and the transfer of the consideration.
Such contracts are not inter-state transactions, though the parties
may be domiciled in different States.  The policies do not take
effect—are not executed contracts—until delivered by the agent
in Virginia.  They are, then, local transactions, and are governed
by the local law.  They do not constitute a part of the commerce
between the States any more than a contract for the purchase
and sale of goods in Virginia by a citizen of New York whilst in
Virginia would constitute a portion of such commerce.68
The Supreme Court adhered to its ruling in Paul for the next seventy-
five years, which meant the individual states continued to regulate insur-
ance companies throughout that time period.
Things changed, however, in 1944.  By then, insurers were content
with state regulation of the insurance industry, but the federal govern-
ment was not.  Insurers had become cartels, controlling premium rates
and boycotting insurance companies that refused to join their cartels.69
States were not taking appropriate actions to stop insurers from engaging
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 170.
67. Id. at 185.
68. Id. at 183.
69. See United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 535 (1944).
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in these activities, so the federal government sued under the Sherman
Act70 to stop insurers’ collusive, anti-competitive conduct.71
Specifically, the federal government indicted the South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Association and its membership of nearly 200 fire insurance
companies as well as twenty-seven individuals.72  The insurers who be-
longed to the association did business in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.73  The association and its member
insurers allegedly controlled 90% of the property insurance market in
those states, fixed insurance premium rates at noncompetitive prices, and
acted to prevent nonassociation insurers from doing business.74  Their de-
fense was that the Sherman Act did not apply to them pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Paul.75
Although the lower courts agreed with the insurers, the Supreme
Court did not. In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court overruled Paul.  The
Court held insurance was central to the conduct of business in the United
States and did constitute commerce that was subject to Congressional reg-
ulation under the Commerce Clause:
The modern insurance business holds a commanding posi-
tion in the trade and commerce of our Nation.  Built upon the
sale of contracts of indemnity, it has become one of the largest
and most important branches of commerce.  Its total assets [are]
the approximate equivalent of the value of all farm lands and
buildings in the United States.  Its annual premium receipts ex-
ceed . . . the average annual revenue receipts of the United States
Government during the last decade.  Included in the labor force
of insurance are . . . almost as many as seek their livings in coal
mining or automobile manufacturing.  Perhaps no modern com-
mercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of
life as does the insurance business.  Insurance touches the home,
the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every
person in the United States.
This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial
compartments which function in isolation from each other.  In-
terrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in
all the states in which they operate are practical aspects of the
insurance companies’ methods of doing business.76
70. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).
71. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 535
72. Id. at 534.
73. Id. at 535.
74. Id. at 535–36.
75. Id. at 536.
76. Id. at 539–41 (citations omitted).
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Thus, beginning in 1944, the insurance industry became subject to federal
regulation and federal antitrust laws.
This change in the regulatory regime was of great concern to both
insurers and the states.77  After Paul, insurers faced both lower profits and
potential jail time for collusive, noncompetitive behavior, while states
faced a loss of tax revenue.78  And, of course, there would be a regulatory
vacuum until Congress or its delegated authority created national insur-
ance laws and regulations.79
C. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and State Regulation of Insurance Since 1945
In response to the S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n decision, insurers and the
states joined forces to attempt to get Congress to overrule the decision.80
To that end, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC), an association comprised of the leaders of state insurance depart-
ments, drafted a proposed statute that would return power to the states to
regulate insurance.81  The primary concerns addressed by the draft legisla-
tion were the preservation of: 1) the state regulatory scheme and 2) states’
ability to tax insurers.82  A secondary purpose of the proposed statute was
the creation of an exemption from federal antitrust laws for insurers.83
The principal argument in favor of allowing states to continue to regulate
the insurance industry was that states were better situated to take into ac-
count local or regional considerations.84
With some modification, Congress enacted the NAIC’s proposal,
which was sponsored by Senator Pat McCarran and Senator Homer Fergu-
77. See, e.g., Alt, supra note 42, at 414; Spencer L. Kimball & Barbara P. He-
aney, Emasculation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 1985
UTAH L. REV. 1, 9 (1985).
78. See, e.g., Kimball & Heaney, supra note 77, at 9.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946) (“Obviously
Congress’ purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future state
systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance.”); Carlson, supra note
2, at 1332–33 (“[B]oth the states and private insurance companies feared the im-
plications of South-Eastern.  The states were concerned about the validity of taxing
and licensing laws from which they derived substantial revenue.”); Kimball &
Boyce, supra note 2, at 554 (“The most serious immediate danger to the states was
that state insurance taxation might be invalidated as an undue burden on
commerce.”).
83. See Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 218
(1979) (“A secondary concern [addressed in the McCarran-Ferguson Act] was the
applicability of the antitrust laws to the insurance industry.”); Carlson, supra note
2, at 1133 (“The [insurance] companies . . . were fearful of the Sherman Act’s
application to price fixing and other anticompetitive conduct in which they had
engaged with impunity since Paul.”).
84. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 86.
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son, resulting in the statute now known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act.85
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides:
§1. Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxa-
tion of such business by the several States.
§2. (a) State regulation. The business of insurance, and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several
States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation.  No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which im-
poses a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30,
1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman
Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the
Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended [15 U.S.C.A. 41 et
seq.], shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the ex-
tent that such business is not regulated by State law.
§3 . . . . (b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce,
or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
§4. Nothing contained in this Act [15 U.S.C.A. 1011 et seq.] shall
be construed to affect in any manner the application to the busi-
ness of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as amended, known
as the National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq.], or
the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq.], or the Act of June
5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.86
In short, states had three years in which to pass statutes that regulated
the “business of insurance” and, if passed, insurers would then be exempt
from federal antitrust statutes.  Insurers would not, however, be exempt
from federal antitrust statutes with respect to any “agreement to boycott,
coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.”  In ad-
dition, the statute expressly provided that the National Labor Relations
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Merchant Marine Act still ap-
plied to the insurance industry.  Finally, Congress remained free to regu-
85. See, e.g., Kimball & Heaney, supra note 77, at 9 (“The National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (or ‘NAIC’) draft bill, with only modest changes, be-
came the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”).
86. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2018).
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late the “business of insurance” by passing other statutes so long as the
statutes were clear that Congress intended the statutes to apply to the busi-
ness of insurance.
Following the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the states, again
through the NAIC, immediately began creating model insurance statutes
for adoption.  The model statutes primarily addressed four areas: 1) rate
regulation, 2) insurer solvency, 3) policy form approval, and 4) unfair
trade practices.  Every state eventually adopted some form of the NAIC’s
model acts.87
In general, the rate regulation statutes provide that insurance rates
should not be “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”88  The
solvency statutes generally impose capital and reserve requirements on in-
surers, dictate the types of investments insurers can make, and specify the
accounting practices insurers should use to ensure that insurers’ financial
reporting provides a clear picture of the insurers’ financial health.89  The
policy form approval statutes empower state insurance commissioners to
review and approve policy forms.  In doing so, they can reject terms that
are “unfair,” “ambiguous,” “unreasonable,” and/or “contrary to public
policy.”90  The unfair trade practices statutes generally empower the state
insurance commissioners to investigate and take action against insurers
for, among other things, misrepresentations, false advertising, unfair
claims handling practices, and unfair discrimination.91
Primarily due to antitrust concerns regarding the insurance industry’s
collusive behavior concerning the sharing of policy forms, pooling of
claims data, and policy pricing, there have been numerous efforts since
1945 to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act and eliminate states’ domi-
nance regarding the regulation of the insurance industry.92  To date, all
such attempts have failed.
87. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 1137 (“By 1951 every state had enacted rate
regulatory laws, most of them substantially similar to the model bills . . .  By 1963
all the states had passed statutes based on [the model Unfair Trade Practices
bill.]”).
88. See, e.g., FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 18, at 796–97.
89. Id. at 792–93; GUENTER & DITOMASSI, supra note 40, at 21 (“Among the
regulatory techniques employed are minimum capital requirements, restrictions
on investments, maintenance of reserves against losses and other policy obliga-
tions, the filing of financial statements, and on-site financial examinations.”).
90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27–14–9 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 33–24–10 (2016);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44–7513 (2016).
91. See, e.g., FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 18, at 793–94; Carlson, supra note 2, at
1137; ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 11, at 147.
92. See, e.g., Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2013,
H.R. 99, 113th Cong. (2013) (eliminating most of the exemptions under the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act for the insurance industry); S. 430, 102d Cong. (1st Sess.
1991) (modifying the antitrust exemption applicable to insurance industry); H.R.
10, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991) (same); S. 719, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1989)
(same); S. 1299, 100th Cong. (1st Sess. 1987) (same); S. 804, 100th Cong. (1st Sess.
1987) (proposing Insurance Competition Act of 1987 which would eliminate fed-
eral deference to the McCarran-Ferguson Act); S. 80, 100th Cong. (1st Sess. 1987)
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D. The Supreme Court’s Limitation of the Scope of Exclusive State Regulation
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act
On its face, the McCarran-Ferguson Act appears to be a broad grant
of regulatory authority to the states over insurance matters.  As interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, however, that delegation of authority
is somewhat limited.  Through a series of decisions issued between 1979
and 1993, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the reverse pre-
emptive effect of state insurance laws on federal laws that indirectly regu-
late the insurance industry.93  The Court did so by narrowly interpreting
the phrase “business of insurance” and broadly interpreting the term “boy-
cott” used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
First, in 1979, in Group Life & Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,94 the
Court held that agreements between health insurers and pharmacies that
limited the cost of the prescription drugs did not qualify for antitrust ex-
emption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act because the agreements were
not part of the “business of insurance.”  According to the Court, the
phrase “business of insurance,” which was undefined in the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act, does not mean the same thing as the “business of insurers.”95
The Court’s review of the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
revealed that the business of insurance was understood by Congress to
involve the underwriting of risk as well as the relationship and transactions
between insurers and their policyholders.96  There was no legislative in-
tent to exempt agreements or transactions between insurance companies
and entities outside the insurance industry.97  Because the agreements
with the pharmacies did not have the effect of spreading risk, they were
not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under federal laws.98  To the contrary,
the agreements merely saved the insureds money and enhanced the insur-
ers’ profits.99
Second, in 1982, in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,100 the
Court held that insurers’ use of outside chiropractors to review the reason-
(proposing repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act); The McCarran-Ferguson Act—
State Antitrust Action Against Insurance Agencies: Hearings on S. 1299 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988); To Repeal or Revise
the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Hearings on S. 80 and S. 1299 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1st Sess. 1987); see also Alt, supra note 42, at
401–02 (discussing repeal efforts from 1977 to 2010); McGuire, supra note 8, at
321 (discussing repeal efforts in the 1990s).
93. See, e.g., Kimball & Heaney, supra note 77, at 11–29 (discussing the Su-
preme Court decisions that restricted the scope of the reverse preemption of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act).
94. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
95. See id. at 211.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 216, 224.
98. Id. at 213–14.
99. Id.
100. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
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ableness of bills submitted by chiropractors for payment did not constitute
the business of insurance; thus, such practices were not exempt from fed-
eral antitrust scrutiny.101  The Court reiterated its commitment to the
three-prong test it first used in Royal Drug to determine whether a practice
is part of the business of insurance:
Royal Drug identified three criteria relevant in determining
whether a particular practice is part of the “business of insur-
ance” exempted from the antitrust laws by § 2(b): first, whether
the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policy-
holder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of
the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured;
and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the
insurance industry.  None of these criteria is necessarily determi-
native in itself.102
In applying that test, the Court concluded the practice of reviewing
the chiropractors’ bills was not related to the spreading of risk, was not
integral to the insurer-policyholder relationship, and was not limited to
entities within the insurance industry because chiropractors are outside
the industry.103  Thus, the practice was not part of the business of insur-
ance and consequently, it was subject to federal laws.104
Third, in 1993, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,105 the Court
took a relatively expansive view of the meaning of the term “boycott” that
is used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  In the Hartford case, nineteen
states and numerous private parties sued a group of insurance companies
that allegedly conspired to force all primary insurance companies to sell
only “claims-made” general liability policies and to make other changes to
the general liability policy form that traditionally had been sold by insur-
ers.106  In deciding whether the insurers’ alleged behavior constituted an
illegal boycott under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which would mean the
conduct was subject to scrutiny under federal antitrust laws, the Court rea-
soned it could constitute an illegal boycott because it was a threat “to with-
hold, wholly or in part, social or business intercourse from, as . . . means of
coercion.”107  Thus, the Court essentially interpreted the boycott excep-
tion to the reverse state law preemption provisions of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act to mean concerted behavior by entities regarding one business
activity that was intended to coerce a party to agree to another business
activity.
101. Id. at 134.
102. Id. at 129.
103. Id. at 130–32.
104. Id.
105. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
106. Id. at 770–72.
107. Id. at 801 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (2d
ed. 1950)).
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In sum, the scope of the reverse preemption provision of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act is fairly narrow under the Royal Drug, Union Labor, and
Hartford cases.  Consequently, as the McCarran-Ferguson Act has been in-
terpreted, the power of states to displace federal statutes that indirectly
regulate insurer behavior is limited.
E. The Federal Government’s Direct Regulation of Certain Areas
of Insurance Since 1945
Although the power to regulate the business of insurance was dele-
gated to the states under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress has had
the authority to regulate insurance whenever it chooses to do so since S.-E.
Underwriters Ass’n was decided in 1944.  Congress has exercised that power
in a few areas of insurance such as Medicaid and Medicare health insur-
ance;108 Social Security disability insurance;109 terrorism insurance;110
employment insurance benefits (ERISA);111 flood insurance (NFIP);112
and health insurance for the uninsured (Affordable Care Act).113
Although all of these areas are worthy of discussion, to illustrate the
pros and cons of federal regulation of insurance based upon Congress’
record, this Article will focus upon the last three areas identified above:
ERISA, the NFIP, and the Affordable Care Act.
1. ERISA
Many types of insurance, such as health insurance, life insurance, and
disability insurance, are provided by employers to their employees as
fringe benefits.  There are a number of reasons employers provide these
types of insurance to their employees.  One, employer-provided insurance
generally is not considered taxable income of the employees.114  Two, any
portion of the premium paid by an employee generally can also be used by
the employee to offset taxable income.115  Three, group insurance mini-
mizes insurer concerns regarding adverse selection because a larger pool
of people being insured decreases the chances that the insurer will only be
108. Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2018).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2018).
110. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, 107 P.L. 297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
111. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
112. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131 (2018)).
113. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Affordable Care
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119–1025 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
114. See FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 18, at 826.
115. Id.
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covering high risk insureds.116  Four, good fringe benefits can be used to
attract better workers and increase worker satisfaction and loyalty.117
ERISA was passed following several high profile pension plan defaults
and it primarily was intended to address pension plans.118  ERISA, how-
ever, also comprehensively regulates employee welfare benefit plans that,
“through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,” provide benefits to em-
ployees and their beneficiaries in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
or death.119  According to Congress, ERISA’s purpose is to “protect . . .
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, . . . by estab-
lishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”120  ERISA expressly pro-
vides that it “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. . . .”121  Consequently,
ERISA is an example of where Congress expressly intended to regulate an
area of insurance, despite the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s preservation of
states’ rights to regulate the business of insurance.
In light of Congress’ goal of “protecting” benefit plan participants, as
it has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, ERISA has
fallen short of that goal in many respects.  For example, state law remedies
that allow for an award of compensatory or punitive damages for bad faith
denials of coverage have been preempted and are eliminated under ER-
ISA.122  Thus, an insured that is wrongfully denied coverage generally is
awarded only the amount of the claim that was wrongfully denied, so there
is no downside financial risk under ERISA for employers to wrongfully
deny insurance benefits to their employees.123
116. Id.  Adverse selection is “the disproportionate tendency of those who are
more likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those losses.”  Kenneth S.
Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: To-
ward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102
n.82 (1993); see also Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exag-
gerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1223 (2004) (arguing that insurers’ alleged con-
cerns regarding the actual impact that adverse selection has on policyholders’
behavior are overblown).
117. See FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 18, at 826.
118. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88
WASH. U.L. REV. 433, 440 n.29 (2010) (“Few dispute that the statute was passed, in
part, as a response to several high-profile pension defaults that arose from com-
pany failures that devastated the pensions of many workers.”); Langbein, supra
note 22, at 1322 (“ERISA was primarily designed to protect pension plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries against two hazards, default risk and administration risk,
that had revealed themselves in pre-ERISA practice.”).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2018).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
122. See supra note 22.
123. See supra notes 22 and 23.
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The fact that the United States Supreme Court has concluded the
remedies available under ERISA provide less protection than state law sug-
gests Congress may not be competent to enact insurance legislation if
Congress intended ERISA to provide employees with greater protections
than they had under state law but it does not as drafted.124  Stated differ-
ently, why would Congress pass a statute it intended to increase protec-
tions for plan beneficiaries but actually provides the beneficiaries with
fewer remedies for denials of benefits than they previously had under state
law?125
Another area in which ERISA is less favorable to consumers than state
law is the rules that apply to the interpretation of insurance benefits plans.
Contra proferentem126 and the reasonable expectations doctrine,127 which
are interpretive rules that favor insureds and are used by the courts when
interpreting insurance policies under state law, do not apply under
ERISA.128
124. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 22, at 1332 (“Dissenting in Mertens, Justice
White lamented ‘the anomaly of interpreting ERISA so as to leave those Congress
set out to protect—the participants in ERISA-governed plans and their benefi-
ciaries—with “less protection . . . than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted.”’”).
125. One explanation that has been advanced by one scholar is that the Court
was afraid that allowing extra contractual liabilities to be imposed on employers
under ERISA would discourage employers from offering employee benefit plans.
See Maher & Stris, supra note 118, at 445, 451 (“Congress wished to make benefit
promises more secure, but not so costly as to result in appreciably fewer or less
generous benefit promises being made overall.”).
126. See, e.g., Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal.
1971) (“Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved
against the insurer.”); RPM Pizza, Inc. v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So.2d 1366, 1369
(La. 1992) (“[A]ny ambiguity must be construed against the insurance company
and in favor of the reasonable construction that affords coverage.”); Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Flanagin, 210 A.2d 221, 226 (N.J. 1965) (“If the controlling language will
support two meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to the
insured, the interpretation sustaining coverage must be applied.” (quoting Mazzilli
v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co. of Winterthur, 170 A.2d 800, 803 (N.J. 1961))).
127. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON, ALAN I. WIDDISS & JAMES M. FISCHER, INSUR-
ANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMER-
CIAL PRACTICES § 6.3(a)(5), at 538 (2d ed. 2017) (“In some circumstances, the
scope of coverage should be predicated on the reasonable expectations of an in-
sured even though an insurance policy includes an explicit and unambiguous limi-
tation that could have been discovered by an insured . . . .”); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v.
McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495–96 (W. Va. 1987) (the reasonable
expectations doctrine provides that the policy should be construed in a manner
that a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the
language to mean, even though painstaking examination of the policy provisions
would have negated those expectations).
128. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 11, at 396 (“Application of this abuse
of discretion standard effectively reverses the normal contra proferentem rule when it
comes to judicial review of coverage claims, creating a presumption against cover-
age when the relevant policy language is ambiguous and coverage under a group
policy has been denied.”); FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 18, at 847 (“The effect of
the abuse of discretion standard of review is that contra proferentem and the reasona-
ble expectations doctrine effectively do not apply to the construction of  policy
language.”).
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In addition, under state law, the interpretation of a policy is a ques-
tion of law that is reviewed de novo by appellate courts.129  In contrast,
under ERISA, if the insurance benefits plan reserves discretion to the
claims administrator to determine coverage under the insurance policy,
then courts review coverage determinations under an abuse of discretion
standard.130  In practice, because almost all insurance benefits plans re-
serve discretion to make coverage determinations to the claims administra-
tor, the deferential standard of review almost always governs.131
Additionally, under ERISA, an insured must exhaust all internal re-
view processes that the insurance benefits plan provides before an insured
can even seek judicial review of a denial of coverage.132  Consequently, the
review process can be more cumbersome and time consuming.  And, fi-
nally, unlike under state law, jury trials are not available to insureds for
denial of coverage claims under ERISA.133
In sum, even though ERISA was originally passed with the intention
of increasing consumer protections with respect to insurance benefits, as
worded and interpreted by the Supreme Court, insureds actually have
more protection under state law than they do under ERISA.  Nonetheless,
Congress has declined to amend ERISA to address this problem.
2. NFIP
The NFIP is another area of insurance law that Congress has expressly
chosen to regulate.  Flooding is the most common natural disaster in the
United States and the world, causing approximately 90% of all cata-
strophic losses annually.134  In the thirty years preceding 2009, flooding
caused approximately $240 billion in damage in the United States, for an
129. See, e. g., Sonson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 100 A.3d 1, 2, 5 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2014) (“Standardized contracts of insurance continue to be prime exam-
ples of contracts of adhesion . . . .  The interpretation of a contract presents a
question of law subject to de novo review.”).
130. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
Scholars also have been critical of the deferential judicial review given to denial of
benefit determinations under ERISA. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Creating a Pater-
nalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit Promise, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 657, 679
(2009) (“[T]here is a procedural system likely to promote fair and accurate review:
de novo review.  Aside from the obvious merit of itself being ‘fair and accurate,’ de
novo review has the additional benefit of consonance with ERISA’s language.”).
131. See, e.g., Maher & Stris, supra note 118, at 472.
132. See, e.g., Davenport v. Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 249 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.
2001).
133. See, e.g., Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.
2003).
134. See Shannon Doocy, Amy Daniels, Sarah Murray & Thomas D. Kirsch,
The Human Impact of Floods: A Historical Review of Events 1980–2009 and Systematic
Literature Review, PLOS CURRENT DISASTERS (Apr. 16, 2013), http://currents.plos
.org/disasters/index.html%3Fp=6695.html [ https://perma.cc/4BWN-XJ84] (dis-
cussing impacts of flooding).
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annual average of approximately $8 billion.135  Three major storms since
2005—Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, and Hurricane Harvey—
alone caused over $280 billion in damage.136
By the 1960s, most insurers had decided that insuring flood losses was
not a risk they were willing to underwrite.  Consequently, since then insur-
ers almost uniformly have refused to insure flood losses under homeown-
ers insurance policies.137
As a result of insurers’ refusal to cover flood losses, the NFIP was cre-
ated by Congress under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to fill
the void.138  A secondary reason the NFIP was created was to recoup some
of the monies the federal government was spending on flood relief efforts
by attempting to get the people who were most likely to be flood victims to
pay premiums to help offset some of the government’s post-disaster relief
costs.139
Many of the major flooding events have exposed the deficiencies in
the NFIP.  For example, the program has been insolvent on and off for
decades.140  The program is currently insolvent in the approximate
amount of $23 billion.141
The NFIP is actuarially unsound by design.  It intentionally has been
charging subsidized premium rates for old homes grandfathered into the
program for decades, which is one of the reasons for the periodic insol-
vency of the program.142
135. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.’S NAT’L WEATHER SERV.,
supra note 17.
136. See Harriett Torry & Sarah Chaney, Big Storm Leaves Small Mark on the U.S.
Economy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/big-
storms-leave-small-marks-on-the-u-s-economy-1537027200 [https://perma.cc/
WN78-GPPX]; Christopher C. French, The Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business
Interruption Insurance Losses, 30 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 461, 463 (2014) (Hurricane Sandy
caused over $60 billion in damage); Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Missis-
sippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471,
1499 (2007) (Hurricane Katrina caused approximately $100 billion in damage).
137. See Kriesel & Landry, supra note 18, at 405.  There are some insurers,
however, that are willing to provide flood coverage under commercial property
policies. See, e.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 662
F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2011) (litigating the issue of whether an “all risk” commercial
property policy provided $50 million or $20 million in coverage for flood losses).
138. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat.
572 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131 (2018)).
139. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-297R, OVERVIEW OF
GAO’S PAST WORK ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 3 (2014), http://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-297R; Klein & Zellmer, supra note 136, at 1490
(citing Rutherford H. Platt, Review of Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain Management
into the 21st Century, ENV’T 25 (Jan.–Feb. 1995)) (“[The NFIP] was also intended to
defray the after-the-fact expense of federal disaster relief by encouraging flood-
plain occupants to pay premiums before disaster struck.”).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(4)(B); Abbott, supra note 24, at 129–30.
141. See supra note 25.
142. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-297R, OVERVIEW OF PAST
WORK, supra note 139, at 4.
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In addition, the claims handlers under the NFIP have conflicts of in-
terest.  The NFIP is currently administered by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), which uses private insurance companies to:
1) sell the NFIP policies on behalf of FEMA143 in exchange for a 30% sales
commission, and 2) handle flood claims when they arise for additional
claims handling fees.144  These private insurers also sell homeowners in-
surance that excludes coverage for flood damage.145  Consequently, when
property damage is caused by a hurricane, there often is an issue of
whether the damage was caused by flooding or the high winds.  The pri-
vate insurers that are handling the homeowners’ claims have a financial
incentive to characterize the damage as flood damage, as opposed to wind
damage, in order to push the loss onto the federal government.146  In-
deed, one insurer’s practices in this regard resulted in a whistle-blower
lawsuit being filed against the insurer following Hurricane Katrina be-
cause the insurer instructed its claims handlers to characterize hurricane
losses as flood losses.147  The case made its way to the Supreme Court,
which affirmed a $3.7 million verdict in favor of the whistle-blowers.148
The actual insurance coverage provided to consumers under NFIP
policies is also poor.  The maximum amount of NFIP coverage available
for a residential property is only $250,000 for the building itself and
$100,000 for personal property.149  Coverage for basements, which is de-
fined as any spaces below ground level, is limited to things like fuel tanks,
furnaces, and water heaters.150  That means a lot of items routinely found
in basements are not covered.  NFIP policies also do not cover property
that is located outside of the house—e.g., landscaping, septic systems,
decks, patios, fences, hot tubs, and swimming pools.151
In valuing losses, unlike “replacement cost” policies that pay the ac-
tual cost needed to rebuild the home or “valued” policies that pay the full
limit of the policy in the event of a total loss, the policyholder receives the
lesser of the replacement cost or actual cash value (i.e., the depreciated
value) of damaged items under NFIP policies.152  A displaced homeowner
143. Scales, supra note 24, at 13–14.
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a; see also Scales, supra note 24, at 14.
145. See Christopher C. French, Hurricanes, Fraud and Insurance: The Supreme
Court Weighs in but Does Not Wade Into the Concurrent Causation Conundrum in State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Rigsby, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 100
(2017).
146. Id. at 101 (discussing the problem as it arose in the context of State Farm
Fire and Casualty Company v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436 (2016)).
147. Id.
148. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. at 444–45.
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(2)–(3) (2018); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, GAO-14-297R, OVERVIEW OF PAST WORK, supra note 139, at 3.
150. See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, FEMA F–679, NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF COVERAGE 3 (2012).
151. See id. at 2.
152. See id. at 4.
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also does not have coverage for the cost of temporary housing under NFIP
policies.153
There also are more pitfalls to getting covered claims paid under the
NFIP than there are under state law.  For example, under the NFIP, the
policyholder must prepare and submit a “proof of loss” form within sixty
days that includes, among other things, bills, receipts, and related docu-
ments.154  Unlike under state law, if the policyholder fails to strictly com-
ply with the proof of loss requirements or fails to bring a lawsuit within a
year in accordance with the terms of an NFIP policy, then coverage is for-
feited under the NFIP.155  Also, unlike under state law, FEMA and the
private insurers who sell NFIP policies and then adjust the claims on
FEMA’s behalf are immune from liability for underpaying claims or acting
in bad faith.156
The NFIP also historically has used outdated floodplain maps due to a
lack of funds needed to create accurate ones, so in many instances homes
that are located in high risk flood areas have not been insured.157  For
example, the flood map for the New York City area that was being used at
the time of Superstorm Sandy was based upon data and modeling that was
over thirty years old.158  The new version of the map for the New York City
area that was released in June 2013 essentially doubled the number of
houses that are located in high-risk flood zones (i.e., the 100-year flood-
plain).159  In sum, if the NFIP is representative of what one can expect
from the federal government in the area of insurance regulation, then it is
hard to argue that it should have a larger role in the regulation of
insurance.
3. Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act is one of the federal government’s most re-
cent regulatory efforts in the area of insurance.  In fact, it is the federal
government’s first significant regulatory effort in the area of health insur-
ance since the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
153. See id. at 2.
154. See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, F-122, DWELLING FORM:
STANDARD FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY § VII.J. 3–4 (2015), https://www.fema.gov/
media-library-data/1449522308118-6752c210f65aed326a9ddf4a0ddaca1f/F-122_
Dwelling_SFIP_102015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYU3-T26V].
155. See, e.g., Shuford v. Fid. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 1337, 1342
(11th Cir. 2007).
156. See supra note 24.
157. See Cummins, supra note 27, at 358; Beth A. Dickhaus & Darrin N. Sacks,
Recent Developments in Insurance Regulation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 571, 582
(2007); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-297R, OVERVIEW OF PAST
WORK, supra note 139, at 36–37; Kriesel & Landry, supra note 18, at 406–07.
158. See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CTR. FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK MGMT. &
COMPENSATION, FLOOD INSURANCE IN NEW YORK CITY FOLLOWING HURRICANE SANDY
1 (2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR
300/RR328/RAND_RR328.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3GL-U6UA].
159. Id. at 2.
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1996,160 which, among other things, addressed employees’ rights to health
insurance when their employment terminated.
Most people have health insurance through their employment or
under Medicare or Medicaid.161  Prior to the Affordable Care Act, how-
ever, there was a gap in health insurance for individuals who did not get
health insurance through their employment or under Medicare or Medi-
caid.162  This gap was large, with approximately 46 million uninsured peo-
ple prior to the Affordable Care Act.163  The number of uninsured people
in America continues to be a problem, but the number has fallen to ap-
proximately 27 million since the Affordable Care Act was passed.164
One of the biggest reasons there were so many uninsured people
prior to the Affordable Care Act was because individuals who had preexist-
ing conditions could not buy individual health insurance because the
available policies contained exclusions for preexisting conditions and in-
surers would refuse to even sell health insurance to people with serious
preexisting conditions.165  Insurers were also free to rescind a person’s
health insurance if the person misrepresented anything material regard-
ing his health when applying for the insurance even if the misrepresenta-
tion was innocent or related to a health issue unrelated to the person’s
subsequent illness for which the person sought insurance payment.166
The Affordable Care Act eliminated many of these restrictions be-
cause health insurance is not conceptually viewed as just a contract be-
tween two parties.  Instead, access to health care is viewed by many people
as a basic human right that can be provided through insurance.167
160. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections 42 U.S.C.
§ 210).
161. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 11, at 344.
162. See Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of
ACA, 36 J. CORP. L. 781, 782 (2011).
163. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, JESSICA C. BARNETT & EDWARD R. BERCHICK,
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016 (2017), https://www
.census.gov/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-260.html [https://perma.cc/
NM5Q-JPYY].
164. Id.
165. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 11, at 349; HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, How Accessible Is Individual Health Insurance for Consumers in Less-Than-
Perfect Health? (June 2001), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/01/how-accessible-is-individual-health-insurance-for-consumer-in-less-than-
perfect-health-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHH9-8GSU].
166. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 11, at 350.
167. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1579, 1584 (2011)
(“The Affordable Care Act embodies a social contract of health care solidarity . . . .
The Act, for the first time in U.S. history, explicitly recognizes a national entitle-
ment to health care for all of the poor.”); G.H. Jones & H. Kantarjian, Health Care
in the United States—Basic Human Right or Entitlement?, 26 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY
2193, 2193 (2015) (“Eighty-three percent of Americans say having health insur-
ance is absolutely essential or very important, and 70% say it is important that the
28
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With that in mind, under the Affordable Care Act, insurers are re-
quired to accept any individual who applies for insurance so insurers can
no longer exclude coverage for preexisting health conditions.168  Insurers
also cannot refuse to renew a policy simply because the insured person is
ill.169  Nor can insurers place annual or lifetime coverage limits on their
policies.170  In addition, insurers’ ability to charge different premium rates
based upon the risk classification of the prospective insured is severely re-
stricted and the policies must provide essential health care benefits.171
Medicaid was also expanded under the Affordable Care Act to in-
clude people who previously did not qualify.172  In addition, people who
do not qualify for Medicaid but cannot afford health insurance are
charged subsidized premium rates based upon the individual’s income
level.173  Consequently, individuals with incomes up to 400% of the fed-
eral poverty line are eligible for the subsidies with the subsidy level increas-
ing as the income level decreases.174
As originally enacted, the purchase of health insurance was
mandatory under the Affordable Care Act, in that people who did not
purchase health insurance had to pay a “penalty.”175  This so-called “indi-
vidual mandate” was based upon adverse selection176 concerns—i.e., only
the old and sick would buy health insurance if young and healthy people
were not otherwise coerced into doing so.177  Opponents of the individual
mandate objected to it on the grounds that it violates the principals of
federalism and individual autonomy because the federal government
should not be able to mandate that people buy health insurance.178  In-
nation has universal health care coverage (as in Medicare for Americans 65 years
or older).”).
168. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-4 (2018).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2.
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
172. States receive federal funding to expand Medicaid rights under the Af-
fordable Care Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 542 (2012).  Thus far, thirty-four states have expanded Medicaid. See
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion
Decision (June 8, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-
activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/?currentTime
frame=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%
22%7D [https://perma.cc/SZ57-AFGF].
173. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 18071.
175. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
176. See supra note 116.
177. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 167, at 1586 (“The individual mandate is an
important part of the solidarity equation because it requires everyone to be in the
health insurance risk pool, addressing the adverse selection problem . . . .”);
Monahan, supra note 162, at 787 (“To combat this likelihood of adverse selection,
the individual mandate seeks to get everyone, particularly healthy individuals, into
the risk pool.”).
178. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 540 (2012).
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deed, one district court that struck down the individual mandate stated
that if the mandate were upheld by courts, then “Congress could require
that people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only be-
cause the required purchases will positively impact interstate commerce,
but also because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and . . .
put less of a strain on the health care system.”179
The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with these types of argu-
ments and held the penalty for failing to purchase health insurance was
really a tax and the federal government has the power to tax.180  In 2017,
the opponents of the individual mandate finally succeeded in defeating it,
however, by eliminating the penalty for noncompliance when Republicans
gained control of both houses of Congress and the White House.181
The Affordable Care Act sought to balance federalism concerns by
federally mandating certain aspects of health insurance coverage but al-
lowing states to create health insurance exchanges to provide a market-
place for the sale of the policies.182  That vision of shared regulation was
not realized across the entire country, however, because many states de-
clined to create health insurance exchanges, and instead, the federal
health insurance exchange was used as the default option.183
III. THE RISE OF MULTINATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANIES AND
ALTERNATIVE RISK TRANSFER MECHANISMS
The evolution of insurance companies and risk transfer mechanisms
over the past two hundred years is another piece of the puzzle regarding
state versus federal regulation of the insurance industry.  Although mutual
companies were the dominant corporate form when insurance companies
were first created in the United States, competition for insurance pre-
mium dollars and capital has driven many mutual companies out of the
market for many lines of insurance.184
Since the 1990s, there has been a dramatic shift in the financial struc-
ture of insurance companies from the mutual company form to the for-
179. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Florida ex
rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012).
180. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 574.
181. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, Title I,
§ 11081(a)(2)(B) (repealing the penalty portion of the individual mandate, 26
U.S.C. § 5000A).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3 (2018).
183. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, State Health Insurance Marketplace
Types (2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-in
surance-marketplace-types/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22
:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/8TE9-CA6P].
184. See FEINMAN, supra note 15, at 48.
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss1/2
2019] DUAL REGULATION 55
profit, publicly traded stock form.185  The principle justification for this
change is that stock companies can raise capital and diversify into other
lines of insurance more easily than mutual companies.186  Mutual compa-
nies’ primary means of raising capital is through retained earnings, unlike
stock companies, which can simply issue and sell additional shares.187  The
shift to stock company form was also driven by the changes in the federal
income tax laws in the 1980s that eliminated the favorable tax treatment
that mutual insurance companies had been receiving.188
The change in corporate form for insurance companies is not a mere
legal technicality.  Stock companies are run for the benefit of shareholders
with profit maximization as the governing principle.189  For stock insur-
ance companies, policyholders are viewed as revenue streams and adversa-
ries with respect to the payment of claims because each dollar paid in
claims is a dollar less of profits for shareholders.190  Mutual companies, on
the other hand, are owned by policyholders and thus, they are run with
the best interests of the policyholders in mind.191  Consequently, the goals
of the two types of companies are completely different.
Insurance companies are also vastly different in size and scope today
than they were in the 1940s when the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
passed.192  Today, multinational, global insurance companies dominate
the market.193  Some of these global insurers have tens of thousands of
employees and market capitalizations of tens or hundreds of billions of
dollars.194  Although these global insurers sell insurance to policyholders
across the United States and throughout the world, they are forced to
185. See Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & J. Tyler Leverty, The Demise of The Mutual
Organizational Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry, 42 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 1011, 1011 (2010).
186. See, e.g, James A. Smallenberger, Restructuring Mutual Life Insurance Com-
panies: A Practical Guide through the Process, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 513, 518–19 (2001)
(detailing competitive market advantages for corporations); Henry Hansmann, The
Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 125,
138 (1985) (discussing fundraising by corporations through bond issuances).
187. See Hansmann, supra note 186, at 138.
188. See id.; Smallenberger, supra note 186, at 523.
189. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 28, at 47–48; French, supra note
31, at 1093; Smallenberger, supra note 186, at 518.
190. See French, supra note 33, at 1093.
191. See id.; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 28, at 47–48 (noting that the pur-
pose of mutual companies is to provide insurance to the policyholder members of
the company, not maximize profits for shareholders).
192. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 8, at 353 (“In the almost half-century since
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, a number of changes have occurred that
call the purposes of the Act into question.  Insurance has become big business, far
larger than it was in 1945, with larger firms operating on a national and interna-
tional scale.”).
193. See, e.g., Sawe, supra note 4 (listing the ten largest insurance companies
in the world and noting the prevalence of multinational companies at the top of
the list).
194. American International Group, Inc. (AIG), for example, sells insurance
in more than 80 countries around the world, had $49.5 billion in revenue in 2017,
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maintain artificial corporate structures due to states’ regulation of the bus-
iness of insurance pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  Specifically,
although they present themselves to the world as a single insurance com-
pany, the “company” actually has numerous subsidiaries and affiliated
companies that are licensed to do business in each of the various states in
which they sell insurance in order to comply with the various states’ insur-
ance laws.195  These related companies act as one, however, in sharing
various administrative services.196
Although reinsurance has been around for centuries, it also plays a
much larger role in the United States today that it did in the 1944 when
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed.197  Today, reinsurance is a world-
wide business wherein global reinsurers insure all or portions of other in-
surers’ risks.198  The reinsurance business crosses state and country lines.
Indeed, most reinsurance purchased today by U.S. insurers is sold by Euro-
pean and Bermuda companies, which are not subject to regulation by the
states in the United States.199  Indeed, two of the three largest reinsurers
and has a market capitalization of approximately $65.1 billion. See AM. INT’L GRP.,
INC., ANNUAL REPORT i (2017).
195. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 543–44; Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra
note 6, at 1633.
196. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 538.
197. See, e.g., FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE BREADTH AND
SCOPE OF THE GLOBAL REINSURANCE MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH MARKET
PLAYS IN SUPPORTING INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2014), https://www.trea-
sury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/FIO%20-Reinsur-
ance%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6QQ-HMCB] (“During the latter part of
the 20th century, few new U.S.-based reinsurers were established despite the eco-
nomic growth during the period.  Bermuda, however, emerged as an international
reinsurance center during this period.”).
198. See, e.g., BARRY S. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSUR-
ANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 15.03[a], at 1357–58 (18th ed. 2017); NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’RS, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND GLOBAL REINSURANCE—EXPLORING LINK-
AGES 22 (2013), http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol6_nat_cat_glo
bal_re.pdf?68 [https://perma.cc/537G-ZKUE]; SWISS RE, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO
REINSURANCE, at 9 (2010), http://media.swissre.com/documents/The_Essential_
Guide_to_Reinsurance_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYN6-PCLE] (“There are many
different forms and types of reinsurance contracts: They either cover entire insur-
ance portfolios or just relate to single risks; they may involve a sharing of all premi-
ums and losses or they may just cover losses exceeding a certain threshold.”).
199. See, e.g., GUENTER & DITOMASSI, supra note 40, at 10 (“[Reinsurance] is
also an international business dominated by non-U.S. companies.”); NAT’L ASS’N
INS. COMM’RS, supra note 198, at 22 n.2 (“US insurers cede (transfer) nearly twice
as much in premium volume to European reinsurers than European insurers cede
to US reinsurers.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-82, INSUR-
ANCE REGULATION: STATE REINSURANCE OVERSIGHT INCREASED, BUT PROBLEMS RE-
MAIN 3 (1990) (“An individual state has no direct authority to regulate reinsurers
in other states or countries who are not licensed in that state.”); Top 25 Non-Life
Reinsurers: Swiss Re Leads, Berkshire Drops in A.M. Best’s 2016 Ranking, INS. J. (Sept.
12, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2016/09/12/
426023.htm [https://perma.cc/V4CJ-V9AD] (most of the world’s largest reinsur-
ers are European companies); FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BREADTH
AND SCOPE, supra note 197, at 5 (“[I]n 2013 approximately $46 billion in total (P/
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in the world are Swiss Re and Munich Re, European companies.200  The
five largest reinsurers in the world account for 67% of reinsurance capac-
ity for the entire world.201
Unlike in past decades, insurers also now sell catastrophe bonds to
institutional investors that cover specific types of catastrophes, such as hur-
ricanes and earthquakes.202  Catastrophe bonds emerged in the 1990s fol-
lowing Hurricane Andrew in Florida and the Northridge Earthquake in
California as a new way to diversify insurers’ and reinsurers’ risks with re-
spect to catastrophic events.203  Under many types of catastrophe bonds,
the investors receive interest payments on the bonds and the return of
their principal at the end of the bond term unless the specified catastro-
phe occurs, in which case the insurer keeps the principal and does not
owe any additional interest payments.204  The retained bond money is
then available to pay the insured losses.
In 2017, a new record of $12.6 billion of catastrophe bonds were
sold.205  Many sellers and buyers of catastrophe bonds are not regulated
by the states’ insurance laws because they are foreign companies or are
located in other states.206
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH STATES CONTINUING TO SERVE AS THE PRIMARY
REGULATORS OF INSURANCE
There are a number of deficiencies in the current state regulatory
regime for the insurance industry.  This Part of the Article addresses some
of the principal ones.
C) reinsurance premiums were ceded by U.S.-based insurers to unaffiliated rein-
surers; of this amount, approximately $28.4 billion of premiums were ceded to
non-U.S. reinsurers and approximately $17.6 billion of premiums were ceded to
U.S. professional reinsurers.”); Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1615
(“[R]einsurance is an international business—the largest companies are located in
Europe and Bermuda . . . .”).
200. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1615.
201. Id.
202. See Scales, supra note 24, at 46; see, e.g., Al Yoon & Leslie Scism, Investors
Embrace ‘Catastrophe Bonds’, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/investors-embrace-catastrophe-bonds-1398292623 [https://perma.cc/7U2X-
SDBH].
203. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-941, CATASTROPHE IN-
SURANCE RISKS: THE ROLE OF RISK-LINKED SECURITIES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THEIR
USE (2002) 15–16, https://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/100802d2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L64R-L4Q3].
204. See Scales, supra note 24, at 46.
205. See $12.6bn of Catastrophe Bonds in 2017 Take Market to New $31bn High,
ARTEMIS (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2018/01/02/12-6bn-of-catas
trophe-bonds-in-2017-take-market-to-new-31bn-high/ [https://perma.cc/DG5B-
TEFR].
206. See id.; see also AON BENFIELD, AON SEC. INC., Insurance-Linked Securities:
Alternative Capital Breaks New Boundaries (2017), http://thoughtleadership.aonben
field.com/Documents/20170907-securities-ils-annual-report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8Y9N-HZSP].
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A. Inconsistent Resolution of Disputes
Because there is no uniformity in the state courts’ interpretation of
the meaning of standardized policy language, whether a claim is covered
by identically worded insurance policies varies from state to state.207  Simi-
larly, although the NAIC has drafted model statutes for adoption by the
states, the NAIC has no authority to pass any laws so there are variations
from state to state in even the model statutes that have been adopted.208
Thus, the outcomes of many insurance coverage disputes are dictated
more by which state’s law is applied than the merits of the case due to the
differences in insurance law from state to state.209  This, in turn, means
the race to the courthouse and choice of law battle can be the most impor-
tant factors in winning many insurance cases.210
The outcome of cases being decided by which party reaches the court-
house first creates the appearance that insurance cases are decided in an
ad hoc, almost random way.  In order for a legal system to be legitimate,
207. For a further discussion of the difficulties inherent in regulating differ-
ent states’ interpretation of standardized policy language and issues with interna-
tional aspects of insurance left to state regulation, see supra notes 8 and 9.
208. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1632 (“[C]oordination is sub-
stantially impeded by the fifty-plus different insurance jurisdictions, each of which
may be represented by commissioners with very different views about regulation
generally and about the prospect of systemic risk in insurance in particular.”); see
also FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE
THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (2013) (“Under
the current system of state regulation, consistency can occur only by adoption and
implementation of [uniform] standards and rules.  As noted, however, the regula-
tory system has not resulted in consistent implementation of solvency oversight,
notwithstanding coordination efforts through the NAIC, because regulators have
interpreted and enforced even similar standards differently.”), https://www.treasu
ry.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/How%20to%20Modernize
%20and%20Improve%20the%20System%20of%20Insurance%20Regulation%20
in%20the%20United%20States.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X3V-XEX2].
209. See KALIS ET AL., supra note 8, § 26.03[B] (“Insurance contracts are inter-
preted according to state law. Not surprisingly, the manner in which the courts of
the various states address similar interpretive issues can vary widely from one state
to the next. The different interpretations given the same standardized language
from one state to the next can mean the difference between a covered and a non-
covered claim.”); 2 PLITT ET AL., supra note 9, § 24:1 (“In theory, the laws of two
states cannot control the interpretation of a contract of insurance, and the choice
of which jurisdiction’s law will govern can have serious consequences for an insur-
ance dispute.”).
210. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 547, 553–54 (1996) (“Conflicts scholars don’t fight bitterly about the differ-
ences among approaches [to determining choice law] because we disagree about
their aesthetic qualities. We fight because the differences matter in terms of out-
comes.”); Peter J. Kalis, James R. Segerdahl & John T. Waldron III, The Choice-of-
Law Dispute in Comprehensive Environmental Coverage Litigation: Has Help Arrived from
the American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project?, 54 LA. L. REV. 925, 933 (1994)
(“The patchwork of state law that has evolved over the past decade or so has raised
dramatically the profile of the choice-of-law issue in [complex] environmental cov-
erage disputes.  The resolution of this issue can be dispositive of whether a claim is
covered, or, at a minimum, can substantially affect the value of the claim.”).
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the dispute resolution process must at least appear to be fair.  Currently,
with each of the fifty states adopting their own insurance laws and inter-
pretations of policy language, the outcomes of many insurance coverage
disputes are not decided by the facts or justness of each party’s respective
position, but rather, by which state happens to hear the case.211
B. Inadequate Regulatory Oversight of Multinational Insurers
and Foreign Insurers
States cannot adequately regulate multinational insurers and they
cannot regulate foreign insurers even though they are responsible for
reinsuring large amounts of losses by U.S. citizens and companies.212
States only regulate the finances of insurance companies that are domi-
ciled in their states.213  This means a multinational company that is doing
business across the entire United States cannot be effectively regulated
because each state can only regulate the portion of the insurer’s business
that is related to its state.  Consequently, there is only piecemeal regula-
tion of national and multinational insurers.  Indeed, state insurance regu-
lators focus on the subsidiaries that do business in their states and they do
not even collect financial information from the parent holding companies
of those subsidiaries.214
The AIG bailout in 2008 is a prime example of this problem.  State
insurance regulators were focused upon the AIG insurance subsidiaries
within their states, but they missed the fact that noninsurance affiliates of
AIG were engaging in risky security transactions.215  Specifically, AIG Fi-
nancial Products, a non-insurance AIG subsidiary, issued credit default
swaps to other companies that guaranteed payment in the event of the
default of mortgage-backed securities that were linked to homeowners
mortgage payments.216  When the housing market collapsed in 2008, AIG
211. See FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 18, at 33–34.
212. See SWISS RE, supra note 198, at 15 (“On average, about 9% of the pre-
mium volume in primary insurance is ceded to reinsurers, accounting for USD 196
billion in 2009.”).
213. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422
(2003) (states only have jurisdiction over activities that occur within their borders);
Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 543 (“[T]he state in which an insurer is domiciled also
reviews [the insurer’s financial data] to ensure that various regulatory require-
ments-such as capital, reserve, and investment restrictions-are satisfied.”); Macey &
Miller, supra note 2, at 33 (“More problematic is the constitutional question of the
geographic or jurisdictional reach of state regulatory power—its legislative
jurisdiction.”).
214. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1633 (“Insurance regulators do
not even require aggregate financial reporting at the holding-company level, much
less regulate core financial measures at the holding-company level, such as capital
levels.”).  State regulators are trying to improve in this area, but their jurisdiction is
limited by states lines.  Id. at 1633 nn.339–41.
215. See id. at 1634.
216. See id. at 1584–85.
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faced massive liabilities.217  The end result was that the company was on
the verge of bankruptcy and ultimately a federal government bailout of
the company totaling $182.5 billion was provided to prevent catastrophic
financial ripple effects that would have occurred if AIG had defaulted on
its financial obligations to numerous other companies.218  AIG might not
have financially collapsed if a single entity had regulatory authority over
AIG as a whole, instead of fifty states and the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion219 regulating the various pieces of AIG.
The regulatory gap problem is even worse for foreign insurers that
either are doing business as “surplus” insurers, which basically means they
are not regulated by states at all,220 or as reinsurers that are covering risks
insured primarily by another insurer.221  In both scenarios, no state has
regulatory authority over the foreign insurers.222
C. Inadequate Policy Form Review and Approval
States’ review and approval of policy forms is also currently inade-
quate.  States’ regulation of the insurance industry in general, and their
approval of policy forms in particular, is an exemplar of the concept of
“regulatory capture.”  Regulatory capture is a situation in which the regu-
lation of the industry is so dominated by the industry itself that the indus-
try is actually regulated for its own benefit.223
Even though state insurance regulators are specifically empowered by
statutes to reject policy forms and language that could be considered un-
217. See id. at 1585.
218. See Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 945 (“Government aid [to AIG] has since
grown to $182.5 billion.”).
219. The federal Office of Thrift Supervision was the regulatory body oversee-
ing the AIG Federal Savings Bank, one of many AIG subsidiaries. See Sjostrom, supra
note 5, at 988.
220. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOBBYN & CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH, INSURANCE LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 517 (5th ed. 2016) (“‘[S]urplus line’ insurers . . . are not licensed in the
state . . . .  [T]he premium rates charged by surplus line insurers are unregulated,
the policy provisions are not reviewed and approved by state regulators, insolvency
assurances are not provided, and guaranty fund protections are unavailable.”);
GUENTER & DITOMASSI, supra note 42, at 295 (“The activities of non-admitted insur-
ers take place outside the jurisdiction in which the insured resides.  They are
shielded to a significant degree from the application of the state’s insurance laws
by Constitutional due process restrictions.”).
221. See McGuire, supra note 8, at 355 (“State law is also simply unable to deal
with international insurers in any effective manner.  Huge international firms, in-
cluding both direct writers, reinsurers, and retrocessional insurers are simply too
large, too complex, and too powerful for most states to control.”).
222. See, e.g., 1A STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 9, § 9:5 (“[T]he majority of
reinsurance agreements involve a reinsurer that is not directly subject to the regu-
latory authority of the state in which the reinsured is admitted.”); McGuire, supra
note 8, at 352 (“It is extremely difficult for the federal government to regulate the
international aspects of the insurance industry under the antitrust laws. It is virtu-
ally impossible for the states to do so.”).
223. For a further discussion of regulatory capture in the insurance industry,
see supra note 12.
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fair, ambiguous, unreasonable, or contrary to public policy, they rarely ex-
ercise that authority.224  In fact, insurance regulators often do not even
require insurers to submit policy forms for approval unless the insurers are
changing policy language, which means that policy language that was ap-
proved decades ago is not actually reviewed by current regulators even
though it is approved.225  In addition, state regulators often are former
employees of insurers who return to work for insurers after they have
served as regulators.226  Further, only insurers have advocates, including
attorneys, who participate on their behalf during the policy form approval
process.227
Consequently, the policy form approval process can be described as
perfunctory.  Indeed, the Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California228 case, in
which insurers allegedly colluded to force consumers to purchase an unfa-
vorable policy form despite state insurance commissioners’ power to disap-
prove the policy form at issue, is a prime example of why insurers and state
insurance regulators cannot be trusted to create and approve policy forms
on their own.
In contrast to the current system, many arguments can be advanced
in favor of having a single, independent third-party draft policy language
for each line of insurance that would be used throughout the entire coun-
try.229  First, using a single drafting entity to produce insurance policy
forms would ensure that the policy language used is consistent throughout
the country.  Second, consumers would not have to be concerned about
whether the policy one insurer is selling contains the same terms and con-
ditions as a policy sold by a different insurer.  Consequently, consumers
could compare insurers based upon price and quality of service instead of
the terms and conditions of the policies, which generally are inscrutable to
most consumers anyway.  Third, using a single third party to draft policy
forms, instead of the current system in which ISO or individual insurers
draft the policy forms without any input from consumers, would allow con-
224. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 11, at 143, 146 (“[M]ost regulators
generally do not invoke [their] broad authority [to disprove policy terms or forms]
in the vast majority of cases” and the “filing of forms is not [even] required when
the coverage is intended for policyholders who have a risk manager or whose pre-
miums, net worth, or workforce exceeds specific thresholds.”); Keeton, supra note
56, at 967 (“Regulation is relatively weak in most instances, and even the provisions
prescribed or approved by legislative or administrative action ordinarily are in es-
sence adoptions, outright or slightly modified, of proposals made by insurers’
draftsmen.”).
225. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 11, at 146 (“A 2011 study found
that most state insurance departments do not have complete copies of different
carriers’ homeowners insurance policies in their records. The reason was that in-
surers typically only filed with regulators the specific policy language they sought
to change, but not the entire policy . . . .”).
226. Id. at 131.
227. See Anderson & Fournier, supra note 11, at 402–05.
228. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770–71 (1993).
229. See generally French, supra note 43, at 569–70.
37
French: Dual Regulation of Insurance
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
62 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: p. 25
sumers’ interests to be considered during the drafting process.230  Fourth,
taking the drafting of policy language out of insurers’ hands would allow
policy forms to use simpler language that could be understood by the aver-
age consumer.231
In sum, although state insurance commissioners have the authority to
regulate the language and coverages contained in policy forms, they do
not exercise that authority in a meaningful way.
D. Inability to Require Coverage Nationwide
States also cannot mandate that policies provide specific insurance
coverages on a nationwide basis because they lack the authority and juris-
diction to do so.232  For example, natural catastrophes, such as landslides
and floods, currently are not covered under standard form homeowners
insurance or commercial property policies.233  Yet, these types of natural
catastrophes that can completely destroy people’s homes and businesses
are exactly the types of risks that should be covered by insurance because
the purpose of insurance is to transfer large uncertain risks from individu-
als to entities that can spread and bear those risks.  Indeed, most countries
in the developed world have recognized this point and either provide cov-
erage through state sponsored insurance programs or mandate that pri-
vate insurance cover such risks.234
In the United States, however, because each state theoretically con-
trols, vis-a`-vis its insurance commissioner, what perils are covered under
the policy forms sold in its state,235 one would need each of the fifty states
to agree that natural catastrophes should be covered by property policies
in order for natural catastrophes to be covered nationwide.  For numerous
political and practical reasons, that is unlikely to occur under the current
system of state regulation.
First, insurers historically have contended that many natural catastro-
phes, such as flooding, are uninsurable, correlated risks so insurers do not
want to cover such risks.236  Correlated risks are risks in which numerous
people in the same geographic area suffer the same type of losses at ap-
proximately the same time.237  Insurers contend correlated risks are unin-
surable because they cannot be predicted with enough accuracy to charge
230. Id. at 570.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (“Laws have no
force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts them, and can
have extraterritorial effect only by the comity of other states.”).
233. See supra note 18.
234. See supra note 19.
235. See supra notes 10 and 11.
236. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 24, at 10–11.
237. See, e.g., Ve´ronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance
Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events,
23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 187 (2012); Cummins, supra note 27, at 342-43.
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actuarially sound premiums.238  Thus, if forced to do so, insurers contend
they would be at risk of becoming insolvent.239  States apparently have
accepted this argument for decades, as evidenced by the fact that no states
mandate that property policies cover flood losses and the NFIP was cre-
ated as a result.  Nonetheless, despite the claim that floods are uninsur-
able, some private insurers actually sell coverage for flooding under
commercial property policies240 and AIG currently sells flood insurance to
homeowners in thirty-seven states241 so perhaps it is time to question in-
surers’ historic contention that flooding is an uninsurable correlated risk.
Second, some opponents of requiring private insurers to cover flood
risks may argue that the risks the people in one state face are not the same
risks people face in other states so they should not be forced to purchase
coverages they do not need or want.242  For example, why should people
who live in Montana be required to have insurance that covers flooding
caused by hurricane-induced coastal storm surges?
Third, some people also may argue that they should not be required
to subsidize other people’s insurance rates, which people who have lower
risk profiles for various natural catastrophes inevitably would be required
to do if all policies covered the same risks.243  Any amount of premium
that a person in Montana pays for hurricane storm surge coverage necessa-
rily must be subsidizing some other person’s losses.244  Ironically, in some
respects, this argument actually favors having insurers sell insurance na-
238. See Bruggeman et al., supra note 237, at 187; Cummins, supra note 30, at
342–43.
239. See Bruggeman et al., supra note 237, at 188; Cummins, supra note 29, at
342–43.
240. See, e.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 662
F.3d 497, 500–02 (8th Cir. 2011) (litigating whether the policyholder had $50 mil-
lion or $20 million in coverage for flood losses under an “all risk” commercial
property policy).
241. See About Us—Private Market Flood, THE FLOOD INSURANCE AGENCY, http://
www.privatemarketflood.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/7TGU-97QK] (“We
currently offer [flood] coverage in 37 States and insure over $4.5 billion dollars of
property values.”) (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
242. This argument is not well founded because people currently are forced
to purchase coverage they do not want or need because the policy forms are stan-
dardized and sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis regardless of whether the person
needs or wants all of the coverages provided under the policy. See supra note 10.
243. Because homeowners insurance is effectively mandatory, the additional
premiums charged to cover such risks would be spread across the 69 million home-
owners with a wide range of risk profiles so the additional premiums for each indi-
vidual homeowner should not be significant. See French, supra note 20, at 79.
244. One response to such an argument is that the purpose of insurance is to
serve as a social safety net and it is not intended to simply be a contract in which
the premium charged to each individual is the precise actuarial amount needed to
cover that person’s predicted risk of loss.  Instead, insurance is a reflection of com-
munity solidarity in which each person contributes to a pool of money to help the
unfortunate few who suffer losses and to provide peace of mind to the majority of
people who do not suffer losses. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 15, at 21–23; Stem-
pel, supra note 30, at 1489.
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tionwide without regard to state boundaries.  If insurers could sell policies
nationwide instead of state by state, then the risk profiles of the pool of
insureds being covered by each insurer would be much more diversified
and insurer concerns regarding adverse selection and correlated risks
would be diminished.245
Fourth, other opponents may argue that any government mandate
regarding what risks should be covered by insurance is inconsistent with
freedom of contract and the concept of freedom in general, which Ameri-
cans highly value.  Self-governance dictates that people should be allowed
to choose what they purchase.246
In short, based upon these arguments, under the current system of
state regulation, achieving nationwide coverage under homeowners poli-
cies for natural catastrophes is highly improbable.  And that is one of the
reasons why some people, insurers, and states advocate for the continua-
tion of the current system.  But, is that what is best for homeowners and
local business owners?
E. Inability to Police Insurer Misconduct Nationwide
States also cannot police insurer misconduct that occurs nationwide.
The State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell247 case illustrates
this problem.  In Campbell, the policyholder attempted to pass six vans
while driving.  In doing so, an oncoming driver swerved to avoid a colli-
sion with the policyholder, which in turn caused the oncoming driver to
hit another car head on.248  The accident resulted in the death of one
person and another person being permanently disabled.249  There was lit-
tle question that the policyholder was at fault, but the insurer nonetheless
refused to settle and went to trial.250  The jury awarded damages in an
amount in excess of the policy limits so the insurer instructed the policy-
holder to sell his house in order to satisfy the excess judgment.251
Eventually, the insurer paid the excess judgment instead of the policy-
holder, but in a subsequent bad faith lawsuit brought by the policyholder
it was revealed that the insurer had a nationwide corporate policy of pay-
ing less than the fair value of claims and it had instructed its claims han-
245. See, e.g., French, Insuring Floods, supra note 19, at 79 (arguing that
mandatory flood coverage under homeowners insurance would spread the risks
associated with floods across 69 million policyholders instead of just the 5.5 million
who currently purchase flood policies under the NFIP).
246. This argument is ill informed because consumers currently do not have
any input into the policy language so freedom of choice regarding the policy lan-
guage is only an illusion.  Moreover, state insurance regulators, not consumers,
currently have power to dictate what coverages policies provide, but they do not
exercise that power.  See supra notes 10 –11.
247. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
248. Id. at 412–13.
249. Id. at 413.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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dlers to falsify records in order to support the unfair payment amounts.252
Under this corporate policy, claims handlers also were instructed to “tar-
get ‘the weakest of the herd’—‘the elderly, the poor, and other consumers
who are least knowledgeable about their rights and thus most vulnerable
to trickery or deceit, or who have little money and hence have no real
alternative but to accept an inadequate offer to settle a claim at much less
than fair value.’”253
After a jury awarded the policyholder $2.6 million in compensatory
damages and $145 million in punitive damages based upon jury instruc-
tions and evidence that allowed the jury to punish the insurer for its na-
tionwide bad faith misconduct, the Supreme Court vacated the amount of
the punitive damages award on appeal.  The Supreme Court held, among
other things, that it was improper for the jury to consider the insurer’s
nationwide misconduct in awarding punitive damages because states do
not have the authority to punish insurers for actions that occur outside of
their borders:
A basic principle of federalism is that each State may make its own
reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within
its borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of punish-
ment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.254
Thus, the Supreme Court vacated the punitive damage award and re-
manded the case for a new punitive damages award determination that
was based only upon the insurer’s misconduct within the state.255
In short, under the current regulatory regime, states do not have the
power to deter or punish nationwide insurer misconduct.  Instead, an in-
surer’s nationwide misconduct must be addressed on a state-by-state basis,
with each state concerning itself only with the misconduct that occurs
within its own borders.
V. DUAL REGULATION INVOLVING BOTH THE STATES AND
THE FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE
The current system in which states are the primary regulators of insur-
ance with Congress periodically interjecting itself in certain areas, such as
ERISA, NFIP, and the Affordable Care Act, has room for improvement.
States cannot adequately regulate multinational insurers and foreign rein-
surers even though such insurers dominate insurance markets.256  States
currently do not regulate policy forms in a way that is protective of con-
sumers.257  Nor can states mandate that particular coverages, such as for
252. Id. at 432.
253. Id. at 433.
254. Id. at 422.
255. Id. at 429.
256. See supra Part IV.B.
257. See supra Part IV.C.
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natural disasters, be included in policies on nationwide basis.258  States
also lack jurisdiction to police insurer misconduct on a nationwide ba-
sis.259  And, the lack of uniformity in state insurance laws means that insur-
ance disputes are often won by the party who wins the race to the
courthouse and secures the more favorable state law, as opposed to the
party whose position is more just.260
Yet, completely turning the regulation of insurance over to the fed-
eral government is unappealing as well.  In addition to the enormous fed-
eralism issue that such a change would create, states have been regulating
insurers for over 200 years at this point so there is an existing body of state
statutes, regulations, and case law that provide guidance to insurers and
consumers alike with respect to insurance matters.  Nothing comparable
currently exists in the federal system so a transfer of complete regulation
of insurance matters to the federal government would be a massive under-
taking that would create great uncertainty for all parties for an extended
period of time.
In addition, federal law in the areas in which Congress has intervened
regarding insurance—e.g., ERISA, the NFIP, and the Affordable Care
Act—provide little comfort that exclusive federal regulation of insurance
would be better for either consumers or insurers.  For example, consum-
ers currently have more remedies available to them, including the right to
assert claims for bad faith and seek punitive damage awards, under state
laws than they do under ERISA.261  Further, the standard of review for
coverage determinations under ERISA is much more deferential to insur-
ers than state law—abuse of discretion versus de novo.262  Consequently,
few consumer advocates would advocate for federal regulation of other
areas of insurance if ERISA would be the template.
Similarly, the NFIP has been a poorly administered insurance pro-
gram so if it is the model that federal regulation of insurance would fol-
low, then again consumers would say, “No thanks.”  The NFIP often is
insolvent.263  The insurance coverage provided under an NFIP policy is
inadequate for many homes in many parts of the country.264  The flood
maps used in the program historically have been woefully inaccurate with
many homes in high risk flood areas listed as being located in low risk
areas.265  The private insurers that are administering claims under the
program have conflicts of interest when it comes to paying hurricane
claims because they typically issue the homeowners policies that cover the
258. See supra Part IV.D.
259. See supra Part IV.E.
260. See supra Part IV.A.
261. See supra Part II.E.1.
262. See supra Part II.E.1.
263. See supra Part II.E.2.
264. See supra Part II.E.2.
265. See supra Part II.E.2.
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properties.266  Consumers also have worse legal rights under the program
than they do under most states’ laws.  For example, as discussed, the un-
timely presentation of a proof of loss results in a forfeiture of coverage
under the NFIP, but it would not under most states’ laws.267
If the Affordable Care Act, on the other hand, is what the country
could expect under a federal regulatory regime, then there may be more
cause for optimism.  The Affordable Care Act actually has done a good job
of achieving one of its primary objectives, which was to lower the number
of uninsured people in America with respect to health insurance.268  But,
the Affordable Care Act has been under constant Congressional attack
since it was passed so its future viability remains in question with each
election.269  It makes little sense to have Congress regulate insurance if
the governing statutes and rules will change with each election every two
years as the balance in Congress swings back and forth between a Demo-
cratic majority and a Republican majority.  Moreover, with the elimination
of the individual mandate, it is questionable whether insurers will even be
able to continue to sell affordable health insurance under the Affordable
Care Act if they are left insuring only old and sick people.270  Thus, if the
Affordable Care Act is the best recent example of Congress’ efforts in the
area of insurance regulation, then perhaps Congress should not be en-
trusted with the important responsibility of regulating the insurance in-
dustry on a nationwide basis in other lines of insurance.
So, is there a better way?  Here is one proposal: dual regulation of the
insurance industry.  Do not strip states of regulatory authority over insur-
ers by repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as many people have advo-
cated in the past.271  In some areas, such as rate regulation, states
generally do a fine job, but in other areas the federal government is better
positioned.  So, the state or federal agency that can best regulate the par-
ticular insurer or aspect of insurance at issue should regulate it.272  To
that end, empower the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) with some regula-
tory authority over the insurance industry.  Create a system of dual regula-
tory authority.  That technically is already the system in place under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, but Congress rarely exercises its authority to reg-
ulate insurance matters so a federal agency with delegated powers should
assume that role.  The FIO might be perfect for the job.
266. See supra Part II.E.2.
267. See supra Part II.E.2.
268. See supra Part II.E.3.
269. See Ed O’Keefe, The House Has Voted 54 Times in Four Years on Obamacare.
Here’s the Full List., WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/21/the-house-has-voted-54-times-in-four-years-
on-obamacare-heres-the-full-list/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f4c9a618051d
[https://perma.cc/D8E8-6Q5V] (The House of Representatives has voted to re-
peal the Affordable Care Act more than fifty times).
270. See supra Part II.E.3.
271. See supra notes 2 and 92.
272. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1628–29.
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In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (Dodd-Frank Act) established the FIO within the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury.273  The President appoints the director of the
FIO.274  The FIO currently, however, only has authority to study various
aspects the insurance industry, write reports, and make recommenda-
tions.275  It does not have the authority to make insurers or states actually
do anything with respect to insurance matters.  Indeed, as currently em-
powered, states generally ignore the FIO.276  Yet, because it already exists
and has expertise regarding insurance matters, it would be well positioned
to start to exert some federal regulatory authority over insurers and issues
that states cannot, or will not, address.
For example, multistate and international insurers need an entity that
has power to regulate them.  They have become too large and important
to U.S. insurance markets for no U.S governmental authority to provide
effective oversight.277  States do not, and cannot, have that authority due
to the limits on their jurisdiction,278 but the FIO could.
The FIO also could replace insurers and ISO as the drafter of policy
forms and issue policy forms to be used on a nationwide basis.  In that
process, it could receive input from experts and advocates who represent
the interests of both insurers and consumers.279  The FIO could shorten
the length of policy forms and use language that can be understood by
consumers.280  As a federal agency, it also could mandate that certain cov-
erages, such as coverage for natural disasters, be included nationwide.281
If insurers do not like the language or the coverages provided in the
policy forms created by the FIO, then they could simply choose not to sell
those lines of insurance.  Of course, such an approach raises the risk that
some insurers may exit some lines of insurance.  It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that a competitive insurance market would not continue to exist
across most major lines of insurance.  The emergence of multinational
and global insurers, worldwide reinsurance, and the advent of catastrophe
bonds that spread the risks that insurers face makes it unlikely that insur-
ers could not offer broader coverage profitably because risks can be
273. See 31 U.S.C. § 313 (2018).
274. See 31 U.S.C. § 313(a).
275. Id. § 313(c); see also Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1631 (“[T]he
FIO itself has no actual regulatory authority over the insurance industry.”).
276. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1637 (“To this point, states
have either resisted or ignored many of the FIO’s suggestions. For instance, states
have refused to allow the FIO to attend meetings of supervisory colleges—wherein
regulators discuss the risks associated with entire holding companies—by arguing
that the FIO’s involvement would not be appropriate.”).
277. See supra Part IV.B.
278. See supra Part IV.B.
279. See French, supra note 43, at 570–72 (advocating for an independent gov-
ernment entity to assume responsibility for drafting insurance policies).
280. Id. at 569–70.
281. See supra Part IV.D.
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spread worldwide today in ways not possible in past decades.282  Thus, if a
risk can be broadly spread, then the only issue is ensuring that actuarial
sound, but fair, premium rates are charged for the entire pool of insureds.
Similarly, the FIO could issue regulations that govern insurer conduct
regarding the advertising and sale of insurance, as well as claims handling
practices, that apply nationwide.283  The states already have adopted
model acts drafted by the NAIC that could serve as templates for nation-
wide statutes.284  The difference, however, would be that the FIO and ag-
grieved consumers could police insurers’ conduct throughout the United
States, as opposed to just within a particular state’s borders.  That would
address the current problem highlighted by the State Farm case—i.e., puni-
tive damage awards that are based upon violations of state law must be
limited to conduct that occurred within the applicable state.285  Thus, if
an insurer were to violate a federal FIO regulation across the country, then
the aggrieved consumers or the FIO itself could bring a lawsuit seeking
damages, penalties, and/or injunctive relief based upon the nationwide
misconduct.
It also is important that the extra contractual remedies that currently
are available under state law, but not under ERISA and the NFIP, be avail-
able nationwide in a dual regulatory system.286  Extra contractual damages
create some downside risk for insurers that is needed to deter insurer mis-
conduct.  Unlike under state law, there currently is no economic downside
for insurers to deny claims in bad faith under the NFIP and ERISA be-
cause an insurer is only liable for the contractual amount owed plus some
nominal interest if it is found liable.287  This means that, under ERISA and
the NFIP, insurers are economically incentivized to deny claims and hold
money owed to insureds as long as possible, which is bad for consum-
ers.288  That would need to change if the FIO were to become responsible
for policing insurer behavior nationwide.
If the FIO were given this additional authority, then one of the big-
gest concerns would be regulatory capture—a problem that currently
282. See supra Part III.
283. See supra Part IV.D.
284. See, e.g., MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS
2011), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-880.pdf?20 [https://perma.cc/
LZ2Z-6UJK]; MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, (NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’RS 2010), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-900.pdf?19 [https://per
ma.cc/6AF6-C5CZ].
285. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
286. See supra Parts II.E.1 and II.E.2.
287. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 28, at 161 (explaining that bad
faith remedies were created because of “the apparent inadequacy of contract rem-
edies to compensate insureds and deter insurers from elevating their own interests
above their insureds’”).
288. See, e.g., French, supra note 31, at 111921 (arguing for the creation of
other financial disincentives, in addition to bad faith claims, to deter insurers’ im-
proper denials of claims).
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plagues state insurance regulators.289  Safeguards would need to be put in
place to ensure that the FIO did not simply replace state insurance com-
missioners as captured agents of the insurance industry regarding the
drafting of policy forms and the policing of insurers.  For example, public
hearings and comment could be required to approve policy forms and
regulations drafted by the FIO to ensure that they are not simply serving
the interests of the insurance industry.  In addition, either insurers or con-
sumers could seek judicial review of FIO decisions or FIO rules at a stan-
dard higher than abuse of discretion to ensure that a disinterested third
party provides some oversight of the FIO.  Thus, even though the director
of the FIO would be appointed by the executive branch and have authority
to promulgate regulations, the FIO’s actions would be subject to meaning-
ful judicial review.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the United States was created, insurers have been regulated pri-
marily by the states, with a few areas in which Congress has intervened.  As
the insurance industry has evolved, however, states have become unable to
adequately regulate some insurers, such as multinational and foreign in-
surers, due to a lack of jurisdiction.  In other areas, such as the coverages
provided by and the language used in policy forms, states have simply
failed to adequately regulate insurers.
Simply turning the regulation of insurance over to Congress is not a
good remedy for inadequate state regulation, however, because the areas
of insurance in which Congress historically has interjected itself has led to
less than exemplary results.  To the contrary, in many circumstances, con-
sumers have less protection under federal law than they had under state
law.
With the creation of the FIO, it is time to consider dual state and
federal regulation of insurance.  The FIO could regulate the areas in
which states are unable to do so or have done so inadequately.  The states,
on the other hand, could continue to regulate the areas in which they
have proven competency such as, for example, policy rate oversight and
insurer solvency for local and regional insurers.
289. See supra notes 12 and 223.
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